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# LPRC PICKETS WEINBERGER



Libertarian Party Radical Caucus (LPRC) members demonstrate outside auditorium where Defense Secretary Casper Weinberger spoke to San Francisco's Commonwealth Club on April 29. Although members of several leftist and Salvadoran support groups also participated in the picket line, the LPRC contingent was by far the largest. Photo/Donnie Gilman.

# LIBERTARIAN VANGUARD

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El Salvador:

## JUNTA LAUNCHES HOLOCAUST

see page 3







## Reagan's "New Beginning": Pentagon Socialism

The much-heralded assault on Big Government by the Reagan administration "efficiency" experts is a myth eagerly accepted by partisans both left and right. Indeed, the hysterical cries of the orthodox liberal/left are almost enough to make one forget that the goal of Reagan's domestic policy is to make the Empire a more efficient engine of destruction on a world scale. This is the real meaning of Reagan's phony crusade to "get government off of our backs," and it is something that is best not forgotten—especially by libertarians.

### REAGANISM: A LIBERTARIAN CLASS ANALYSIS

When Ronald Reagan talks about cutting Big Government down to size, what he really means is that he only wants to lower its growth rate. Because of legislation enacted since WWII and the New Deal, the growth of the public sector is inherent in current law. According to Rudolph G. Penner of the American Enterprise Institute, 1986 outlays are almost 40% higher than 1981 outlays. Planned growth of the public sector exceeds the assumed inflation rate by about .05% per year. Contrary to the popular illusion—maintained by both left and right—Reaganism is a desperate attempt to shore up a public sector which is economically and ideologically bankrupt. Far from destroying the power of the New Class bureaucracy—a privileged elite of technocrats, academics, politicians and financiers who dwell very near the public trough—the neoconservative revival will merely militarize and strengthen the public sector at the continued expense of the private sector. By 1982, the military's authority to spend will rise by almost 20% after adjusting for the inflation rate. In the next three years the Pentagon's share of total Federal spending will rise from 24.1% to 32.4%. In addition, actual spending will run 27% above the inflation rate over that same three year period. By 1983, the increase in military spending will be larger than in any year in the last two decades ex-

cept 1967. (The buildup during the Vietnam war was 47% over three years.)

Whatever cuts made in so-called "social" programs (i.e. social control programs designed to defuse domestic discontent) are more than made up for by "defense" budget increases—social and political control programs to quell discontent in the various American colonies and client states abroad. Far from representing a retreat, this shift in the balance of class forces within the ruling elite—from the civilian to the military—represents an *advance* for the public sector and its New Class at the expense of the private sector.

But this broad-brush sketch of the class forces involved is hardly sufficient for our purposes. For now that the neo-

conservatives have *state power*, now that they are the guardians of the Empire, their real politics will crystallize into a particularly virulent strain of the statist disease. This deadly species thus requires extensive dissection.

Reagan's militarization of the economy will objectively go against the interests of the private sector in general; however, he most certainly has the support of such companies as General Dynamics, McDonnell Douglas, United Technologies, General Electric, Lockheed, and Boeing, who are in on the biggest gravy train in human history. This completely militarized section of the "private sector" is "private" in the same sense that the CIA is "private"; that is, not at all. Although these companies have their origins in the private sector, they have gone over to the other side of the class line which divides governments from those they rule. Thus, in exchange for shifting the balance of power from the civilian to the military, the big corporate state financiers are permitting David Stockman to make a few symbolic cuts.

The neoconservative theoreticians and "supply-side" economists behind the Reaganite/corporate state alliance are perfectly aware of what it is they are doing. Why don't they recognize that the status quo and the free market are *incompatible*? Well, in fact they do recognize this fact. Indeed, it is acknowledged openly by all neoconservatives. After fifteen pages of bromides about the virtues of democracy ("the electorate (is) wiser than any individual in the society") "supply side" economist Jude Wanninksi outlines the Reaganite approach: "No single candidate," he writes, "could possibly satisfy all the electors, however, in the modern nation state, individual electors have self-interests that are diametrically opposed to the interests of other electors. . . there are individuals whose welfare requires peace and those who benefit from tension." What is the Reaganite/neoconservative solution? The *Libertarian* solution is peace; but Wanninksi chooses class peace. "Each such interest is," he says, "in its own way a legitimate one that a politician must . . . take into account. . . . But," Wanninksi continues, "while a politician can not satisfy electors who are diametrically opposed, neither can he ignore one class of elector or another, perhaps with the idea that because he cannot possibly satisfy both, he will throw his lot entirely with the one. *Even when* an issue can be settled by voting, ninety-nine-to-one, the politician must in some way attempt to accommodate the one. At the extreme, if the issue . . . is perceived by the one as in some way threatening his very survival or directly involving his extinction, the one may resort to extralegal balloting to defend himself, perhaps even attempting assassination. [*The Way the World Works*; Touchstone; p. 15].

The vital point that the "supply-

side" fail to mention is that the big increase in capital investment which (they assert) is coming if their program is enacted will flow into the defense industry. Far from increasing the power of the private sector, their program will militarize the economy—and tip the balance of class forces decisively in favor of the *public* sector. Far from establishing the foundations of a free society, these alleged advocates of a free market are merely serving as front-men for imperialism.

Thus, those who pose as defenders of the "free market" "accommodate" the unprecedented growth and militarization of the public sector and its ruling elite. This is why the Libertarian Party Radical Caucus (LPRC) declared in its *Draft Program*: "A class-collaborationist political program can only be an attempt to make the State more 'efficient.' Such a reform strategy only *strengthens* the public sector, and consigns libertarians to permanent political impotence. Opportunism is class treason." The submergence of pseudo-free market forces in the Reagan regime—which cannot and will not roll back the power of government—dramatizes precisely which component of the corporate statist/conservative alliance is dominant.

Decades of Keynesian economics have brought the welfare/warfare state to the end of the road. Determined to "clean up its act" and run a tight ship of state, the U.S. ruling class is merely trying to streamline the Empire and put Imperial America's house in order.

### "SUPPLY-SIDE" ECONOMICS VERSUS LAISSEZ FAIRE


In essence, the much-touted "supply-side" ideology of born-again Reaganism is the neoconservative equivalent of social engineering and economic planning. It is a technocratic creed, which sees "economic growth" *per se* as inherently good, whose partisans will not hesitate to use the State to impose the values they believe are central to maintaining the status quo.

The industrial decline of the U.S. is now going into its second consecutive year, and the ruling corporate/managerial elite is getting nervous. With a new arms race on the agenda, with a new holy war against the USSR about to go into high gear, this is no time for an economic downturn. The "supply-side" answer is *not* a free market economy; that is, an unregulated market system backed by a gold standard. Instead, they propose shifting the emphasis of government intervention from stimulating consumption to stimulating capital accumulation and production. The supply-side attitude toward inflation is particularly revealing. In a recent interview, it was George Gilder (whose *Wealth and Poverty* is a supply-side Bible of sorts) who said, when asked whether he agreed with the idea first expressed by David Marsh that infla-

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Stockman and Treasury Secretary Donald Regan.



Alexander Haig at confirmation hearing before Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

## The Case of SLS, Part II

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major issue with which we can appeal to the young."

So there we have it: the real, cynical reason for the Crane Machine/SLS adoption of the anti-nuclear cause. The anti-nuke agitation is the only one likely to appeal to middle-class liberal youth, and this will bring to the LP a bunch of eager petition-gatherers and volunteer workers.

Given his opportunist adaptation to the youthful liberal-left, it is no wonder that Friedman was later to wail in the pages of *LR*, that John Anderson—who was nothing if not the candidate of the liberal media and campus youth—had "stolen our constituency." Sure, if one thinks of the Jane Fondas and the Tom Wickers and their counterparts on the campus as "our constituency."

Continuing Friedman's strategy memo, he saw that the major opponents of his anti-nuke emphasis would be LP members and activists who might be "alienated" by this approach. Friedman did not explain why this was "potentially a very serious problem." Why would a large number of libertarian activists be turned off by his anti-nuke stance if this stance follows from libertarian principle? Obviously since it does *not*, and because Friedman knew darned well that his anti-nuke policy is a violation and a betrayal of the libertarian position. He knew very well that he and the rest of the Clark campaign were paving the way for a sellout.

What then to do about these alienated Libertarians? (Whom Mueller would undoubtedly call "Old Dealers.") Friedman suggests various techniques of persuasion to soften the opposition of dedicated libertarians. The "means of persuasion" are a combination of soft-soap, ("Treat their doubts and/or objections respectfully and courteously." Gee thanks, nurse!) and urgent pleas that we *must* be anti-nuke in order to beat the dreaded Citizens' Party as the No. 3 party in the country. (Presumably a goal vital enough to justify any means to achieve it.) Friedman also recommends that *Libertarian Review* can be instrumental in this task, but he warns that *LR* must be, or at least appear to be, "open and conciliatory" on this issue. And the anti-nuclear staff should deal personally with these Libertarian complaints, "so as to sensitize them as to 'how far they can go' and how to go about it." "How far" would you like to go, Jeff?

But, ultimately, Friedman wasn't worried about the Libertarian grumblers; after all, they are committed to the LP and therefore "will not lightly decide to quit the LP or sit out the most exciting libertarian effort ever." Perhaps not in 1980, Jeff; but how many times do you expect them to sit still for another con?

Reading his odiously opportunist memo, one begins to think that perhaps Friedman's problem is not, after all, an overzealous devotion to one-sided logic. This insight is confirmed by Friedman's critical memorandum on the final SLS Statement issued by its national convention in the summer of 1980, and which consisted of an admixture of Mueller's garbled and incoherent draft and the alternative draft of the Radical Caucus. Friedman comes down hard against the Radical Caucus contributions, which spoiled the (Mueller) introduction which "almost soars" (?) because of its breakthrough "humanistic" approach. If "humanism" is, as it usually is, a fancy synonym for "mush-minded," then Friedman is right, except that it is scarcely a "breakthrough" to think and write like a cretin. There are enough cretins in the world without Friedman and his ilk elevating such thought to the status of "humanism."

Apparently what Friedman objects to is that the RC parts of the Statement "elaborate upon our ideology" and "lectures" the readers. Well, what is a solemnly drawn up Statement by SLS supposed to do if not elaborate upon our libertarian ideology? No, says Friedman, instead of doing that, we must explain to students "why we believe what we believe, in terms they are interested in and can understand." This "humanism" is the "vocalization of

how disenchanted students view politics." Friedman is particularly critical of the "Free Market Radicalism" section of the final Statement which the RC was able to substitute for the Mueller version. The RC version, says Friedman, is that of a "distant ideologue giving an introductory Austrian economic lesson, rather than someone of our generation expressing the way our peers see inflation, unemployment, bureaucracy, government and corporate power, and then showing how libertarianism fits in. We ought, I think relate everything in our Statement to how students see the world, rather than simply stating how we see it."

### THE POLITICS OF THE LOWEST COMMON DENOMINATOR

All this demonstrates that Friedman and Mueller are not simply opportunists on nuclear power and many other issues. Both of them are suffused with utter and total contempt for the minds of the students whom they are trying to recruit into the libertarian movement. All the nonsense about "distant ideologue" and "our generation" simply means that they believe that students are not capable of coherence, rational thought, or of writing or absorbing clear English. They regard students as a pack of morons, and their only excuse for Mueller's having written his imbecilic product is that since students are all cretins the SLS Statement must reflect their own vapid and emotional outpourings.

But what good is a libertarian youth movement full of cretins incapable of thought? If we appeal to that kind of student, then that is precisely the kind of student we are going to get. What kind of knowledgeable "cadre" is that? We must appeal to students who can think, who can reason coherently, and who do not find themselves profoundly insulted by having to plow through Mueller's gabble in the Draft Statement.

It is possible, of course, that Mueller and Friedman are not simply pretending to be cretins in order to suck in large numbers of students, but that their writings are a faithful representation of the quality of their own minds. After painfully studying their works, this is not a hypothesis which I am prepared to rule out. One of the things for which we cannot lightly forgive the Crane Machine was having plucked Mueller and Friedman out of the obscurity which they so richly deserve.


### HORSE OF A DIFFERENT COLOR

When we turn to Tom Palmer we face a horse of a very different color. Of all the members of the Crane Machine, Palmer is the most personally devoted to his Chief. But, in contrast to the rest of the SLS troika, Palmer is a young man of considerable intelligence and erudition, and is generally rational and fair-minded in interpersonal and organizational dealings. His fall from grace is the hardest to bear. For Palmer was once a knowledgeable and committed radical, hammering away at ideological and strategic deviations without fear or favor (e.g. his assault on the gradualism of Robert Poole's book on tax cuts in the January-February 1977 *Libertarian Review*). But, alas, all that is over, for Palmer listened to the call of his Master's Voice in the spring of '79.

The major apologia for the Clark campaign has been written by Tom Palmer. ("What the Clark Campaign Achieved: An Insider's View," *Frontlines*, Jan. 1981.) Not only is it a slippery and evasive document, but the once principled ideologist has fallen to the status of mere technician. There is almost no discussion of principles or ideas in the Palmer article; it is all a justification for the fund-raising, media, vote projection, etc., mistakes of Crane et al. Once again, John Anderson is the whipping boy for the paucity of votes. (What will Crane & Co. do if Anderson runs again in '84?) Mistakes are all put down as part of an inevitable "learning curve"—a whitewash argument which could be used to justify any incompe-

# WE SAID IT FIRST!

In July of 1980, the LPRC published an analysis of the Clark campaign's "low-tax liberal" opportunism—five months before it became tragically obvious to most LP members that Clark's campaign was a sell-out. From Clark's neo-Republican economic program to his unlibertarian position on the immigration question and the existence of the border patrol to his inexplicable foreign policy reversals—all this and more was documented and criticized in a twelve-page pamphlet, *A Matter of Principle*, now going into a second edition. Of course, the storm of controversy which has erupted over the conduct of the Clark campaign has now taken center stage in the ongoing debate within our movement over strategy and tactics. But the issues now being raised by a wide variety of forces and individuals in the LP were first raised by the LPRC; uniquely, we predicted the problem in advance, and offered a comprehensive solution. The many published criticisms of the Clark campaign which have appeared since November all basically update and re-state the case against opportunism first put forward in this pamphlet, which is available from the LPRC for only \$1.00. Send in your order today and get a free copy of Murray Rothbard's "Libertarianism Versus 'Low-Tax Liberalism.'" Order from: LPRC, 1800 Market St., SF CA. 94102.



tent manager or director in any sort of activity—corporate, political or whatever. The only discussion of the ideology and content of the Clark campaign is Palmer's exulting that the Clark White Papers proved to the precious media "the 'seriousness' of our ideas and programs." Palmer's only other ideological reference was to hail Clark as presenting libertarianism as a "benevolent and humane alternative." How the mighty have fallen!

But what is Palmer's vision for SLS? The only indication of that vision is in his letter to Mueller (Palmer to Mueller, Nov. 10, 1980). There is no question that Palmer's SLS would be a welcome shift away from the cretinism and the "cultural revolutionary" hogwash indulged in by Mueller. Palmer's letter is sharply critical of Mueller's idea of a "libertarian culture," and is heart-warmingly firm in his insistence that student activists read and study libertarian theory and the heritage of libertarians of the past. To the extent that Palmer stands for intelligence and for opposition to cultural cretinism, his is a welcome change of focus for SLS. But, on the other hand, Palmer wishes to fold SLS almost completely into the LP, which—presumably—would mean the 1980-sellout-LP dominated by Crane and Clark.

More ominous is Palmer's warning that SLS should *not* implement Mueller's suggestion of an anti-Reagan focus for the coming years. This is disquieting; since Reagan is president, what other focus should SLS have but to oppose him? There is nothing wrong with promoting beer busts; but the combination of Palmer's pushing beer busts and toning down attacks on Reagan begins to smell like a possible shift in the works by the Crane Machine from left to right opportunism. For opportunists are creatures who don't really care *whom* they sell out to. Opportunists by their nature sell out to whom-ever they think can bring them short-run advantage: in money, influence, or votes. If they think that the country has moved rightward and that therefore the expedient thing to do is to appear to be rightist, they are perfectly capable of

dropping "low tax liberalism" for "low tax conservatism." Chameleons follow their nature. The evidence is not in, but libertarians should not be startled if such a change is made. The Crane Machine is quite capable of doing it.\*\*

Palmer might want SLS to pull in its horns and stick to study, Grand Theory, and beer busts, and eschew the cultural radicalism of the Mueller era. But, if not Palmer or Mueller, *someone* will inevitably have to guide SLS in making applications of libertarian theory, and the way things shape up, that someone is going to be the new director, Jeff Friedman. In a Palmer-Friedman-run SLS, therefore, we may expect to see more emphasis on libertarian theory, but also more opportunism, even more hysterical anti-nukeism, and greater adaptation to the special kind of Crane/Clark opportunism in the Libertarian Party. And we can expect more stringent Crane control over the organization.

Overall, SLS does not present a pretty picture. The brief battle between the Mueller and Palmer/Friedman forces was a tempest in a teapot. At stake were personalities and minor variations on a common theme: opportunism and Crane domination. Until SLS liberates itself and casts off all control by Crane puppets and hirelings, its efforts will be null and even counter-productive. Yes, we strongly need a campus youth movement; but No, the last thing we need is an organization which forms yet another extension of Edward Crane's cynical and power-hungry disregard of principle and of the libertarian cause which we hold so dear.

\*\*In contrast to some of my colleagues on the RC Central Committee, I don't believe that the recent organizational shifts at SLS and LP, and their move to Washington, necessarily heralds a shift to the right by the Crane Machine. A more plausible explanation is financial rather than ideological. It is more likely that the financial backer of these organizations understandably got fed up with the fact that Mueller and Childs were spending money as if there were no tomorrow, and that the move is an attempt to put these institutions on a more fiscally responsible basis. But time will tell. [Editor's note: We invite Dr. Rothbard to read "Opportunists Move Rightward (Part II)" elsewhere in this issue.]



# WE'RE BUILDING A MOVEMENT!



photo/Jannie Gilman

## Sick and Tired of "Low-Tax Liberalism"? JOIN THE LPRC!

YES, I'm a Libertarian Party member who thinks "low-tax liberalism" is no substitute for libertarianism. I agree with your ten-point program, and I want to join the LPRC. Sign me up as a:

- Patron (\$100) (you get all LPRC publications plus Rothbard's FOR A NEW LIBERTY)
- Sustainer (\$10 per month) (you get all LPRC publications plus Rothbard's LEFT AND RIGHT)
- Contributor (\$75) (you get LV, Cadre, & ten gift subscriptions)
- Supporter (\$50) (you get LV, Cadre, & five gift subscriptions)
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- Regular Membership (\$12) (you get LV & Cadre)

YES, I need a good dose of radical libertarianism. I want to subscribe to LIBERTARIAN VANGUARD for

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### BACKTALK

continued from page 21  
 their proportion of control over the directions taken by the organization. We find an increased voice for the contributor to be a concept superior to that tedious concept of egalitarianism popularized by Robert's Rules of Order.  
 I just this afternoon finished reading your analysis of the Clark campaign entitled "A Matter of Principle." You have my enthusiastic support in all

LPRC efforts to (1) rectify the LP's political line, to (2) develop cadre, and to (3) build a mass movement.  
 Very truly yours,  
 Rex Fowler

The editor replies: Thank you for your comments and suggestions. We have been functioning under the terms of a provisional set of bylaws since our founding in February of 1979. The LPRC Central Committee is presently working on a revised draft which will be submitted to the membership.

## The Ten Points of the Libertarian Party Radical Caucus

(Adopted by the LPRC Central Committee, July, 1979)

The Radical Caucus of the Libertarian Party is dedicated to building the Libertarian Party by emphasizing the following ten points:

1. **Principled Mass Party**—The Libertarian Party should be a mass-participation party operating in the electoral arena and elsewhere, devoted to consistent libertarian principle, and committed to liberty and justice for all.
2. **Resistance & the Oppressed**—The Libertarian Party should make a special effort to recruit members from groups most oppressed by the government so that the indignation of those who experience oppression is joined to that of those who oppose oppression in principle. The Libertarian Party should never approve of the initiation of force, nor should it rule out self-defense and resistance to tyranny.
3. **Anti-State Coalition**—The Radical Caucus agrees to the view, adopted by the Libertarian Party at its 1974 Dallas convention, that for purposes of party programs and activities the issue of the ultimate legitimacy of government per se is not relevant. We oppose all efforts to exclude either anarchists or minimal statist from party life.
4. **Populism**—The Libertarian Party should trust in and rely on the people to welcome a program of liberty and justice. The Libertarian Party should always aim strategically at convincing the bulk of the people of the soundness of libertarian doctrine.
5. **No Compromise**—The Radical Caucus insists that all reforms advocated by the Libertarian Party must diminish governmental power and that no such reforms are to contradict the goal of a totally free society. Holding high our principles means avoiding completely the quagmire of self-imposed, obligatory gradualism: We must avoid the view that, in the name of fairness, abating suffering, or fulfilling expectations, we must temporize and stall on the road to liberty.
6. **Anti-Imperialism & Centrality of Foreign Policy**—Because the United States government aspires to world-wide control of events, foreign policy is always potentially the most important issue of our time. The Libertarian Party should bring to the public the truth about the U.S. government's major responsibility for the cold war and the continuing threat to world peace posed by U.S. foreign policy. No one should be deceived by the notion that any government, like the American, which has a relatively benign domestic policy, therefore has a relatively benign foreign policy.
7. **Mutual Disarmament**—The Libertarian Party should support general, joint, and complete disarmament down to police levels. The Libertarian Party should be in the forefront of efforts to end policies that prepare for mass murder.
8. **Rights Are Primary**—The central commitment of the Libertarian Party must be to individual liberty on the basis of rights and moral principle, and not on the basis of economic cost-benefit estimates.
9. **Power Elite Analysis**—American society is divided into a government-oppressed class and a government-privileged class and is ruled by a power elite. Libertarian Party in strategy and pronouncements should reflect these facts.
10. **Land Reform**—Because of past land theft and original claims not based on homesteading, many landholdings in American are illegitimate. The Libertarian Party in cases of theft (for example, from the Native Americans and Chicanos) should support restoration to the victims or their heirs and in cases of invalid claims should advocate reopening the land for homesteading.

Dear Sirs,  
 Enclosed is \$30. I would like to order 20 (or however many you can spare) extra copies of the Oct. issue of *Libertarian Vanguard* to keep in my office, distribute to friends, etc. I would also like to extend my subscription. I must admit that this issue has made me a more enthusiastic fan of *Libertarian Vanguard* than I was before. The Murray Rothbard speech is a real classic. I enjoyed the piece on SLS too. I am mentioning the Rothbard speech in the upcoming issue of our newsletter and

suggest that readers donate or subscribe to *Libertarian Vanguard*.  
 Della A. Scott  
 Secretary, Montana LP  
 Editor's note: This is as good an opportunity as any to announce that LP newsletters may reprint articles which appear in *Libertarian Vanguard* free of charge, provided that proper credit is given. In addition, an ad appropriate for LP newsletters is now available to local LPRC activists. (We have gotten several requests.) Write us for details, or call: 415-864-0952.



A refugee center in San Salvador.

## El Salvador: Junta Launches Holocaust

As the U.S. charges blindly ahead with plans to "draw the line" against "Soviet aggression" in El Salvador, liberal/left commentators are comparing the rapidly worsening situation with initial steps taken by the U.S. prior to the Vietnam war.

Of course, the analogy holds true if you focus on domestic response to Reagan's war moves. An anti-war movement is now taking on a rather familiar form on a national scale. Already, Congressional liberals are getting nervous and mobilizing their limited resources to cut off U.S. aid to the junta.

And, of course, the Reagan administration is playing its part to the hilt, in spite of initial reluctance to divert attention away from the battle over the budget. Already, General Haig is straining at the leash, growling about "going to the source of the problem" this time. Haig and his cronies seem determined to achieve the kind of military victory denied him by the Vietnamese people less than a decade ago.

### THE SLAUGHTER BEGINS

This time, the imperialists mean business. When the Reagan administration asserts that El Salvador's civil war is not going to be a repeat of the Vietnam scenario they are being perfectly sincere—and, indeed, they are absolutely correct. They have no inten-

tioned rebellion by exterminating over 4% of El Salvador's total population. [See *Libertarian Vanguard* February/March 1981; "El Salvador: Yankee Go Home!"] When Roberto D'Abuisson, leader of El Salvador's ultra-right "death squads" came to the U.S. under the auspices of the American Security Council last year he openly proclaimed



Victims of the junta.

tion of getting bogged down in another interminable land war, a protracted conflict which they probably wouldn't win. In El Salvador, the strategy of imperialism will be much bolder from the very beginning.

El Salvador's history is one long saga of bloodshed and repression, revolution and counter-revolution. In 1932, the ruling generals, in league with neo-feudal landowners, crushed a Commu-

his willingness to slaughter yet another 32,000 peasants if a repeat of 1932 would save El Salvador's oligarchy. Indeed, this "holocaust" scenario is quite clearly the current policy of the U.S., as well as the junta and the ultra-right. Thus, the Reaganites are themselves helping to explode propaganda myths which characterize the junta as a "moderate" regime caught in a left/right crossfire. After substantially in-

creasing military and "economic" aid to the junta, the new Administration has even taken the politically risky step of sending in fifty more U.S. "advisors"—who allegedly are not supposed to be directly involved in the fighting. This is much more than a symbolic act; in fact, these "advisors" are professional assassins who will "advise" the junta and the death squads as to how to liquidate all opposition efficiently and quickly. This "quick kill" scenario will not—the Reagan administration hopes—require a large U.S. force, or anything other than massive infusions of money and intelligence resources.

### CAN THE REBELS WIN?

In spite of U.S. government propaganda, only a trickle of arms supplied by the Soviet bloc nations is reaching the rebel forces. As Roy Childs says in *Libertarian Review*: "According to Haig's own State Department Special Report, the first weapons shipped from the Communist bloc nations to the Salvadorean guerrillas did not reach them until September, 1980." From 1950 until 1979, U.S. aid to El Salvador totaled \$16.7 million. Since 1980, the U.S. (and the International Monetary Fund) have sent over \$260 million directly to the current junta. (And that's not including millions more in military aid through "unofficial channels.")

U.S. pressure has cut off whatever aid to the rebels was coming in from Nicaragua. And, as we go to press, Congressional subcommittees have just approved \$25 million more in aid to the junta.

In addition, a general strike called by the guerrilla united front was only partially successful. Government troops

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Junta troops on parade in the streets of San Salvador.

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have scored a number of military victories—destroying one major northern rebel base near a volcano—and the FMLN (Farabundo Martí Liberation Front) has announced a “tactical retreat.” Meanwhile, the terror campaign of ORDEN, the White Warriors Union, and other ultrarightist gangs associated with the junta’s national security forces, continues unabated.

Thus, while the plight of the rebels has never been more desperate, the governments of Nicaragua, Cuba and the Soviet Union continue to deny that they’re aiding the guerrilla fighters. And one is inclined to believe them. Nicaragua has internal problems that may eventually split the Sandinista movement and topple the leftist government. Cuba is being directly threatened by Haig with a blockade—which would almost certainly spell economic and political disaster for Fidel’s increasingly unstable regime. Fidel, the “enfant terrible” of the socialist bloc, would almost certainly not have the full backing of the Soviet Union, which is not about to risk nuclear war to please the troublesome, over-ambitious Cuban leader. Quite the contrary, the Kremlin will undoubtedly take full advantage of this opportunity to rein Cuba’s Napoleon in, and tighten the leash which is a noose at one end.

In answer to General Haig and his State Department propagandists one can only say: no, unfortunately you are wrong. In spite of their anti-imperialist rhetoric—which is for home consumption, at any rate—neither Nicaragua, nor Cuba, nor the Soviet Union can or will save the people of El Salvador from another *matanza* a la 1932. Today, the people of El Salvador stand almost alone in their heroic fight against the biggest imperialist power on earth.

It is here that the Vietnam analogy begins to break down. Although Russian and Chinese aid to Hanoi was meager, reluctantly given and sporadic, between Peking and Moscow some sort of aid was always forthcoming. In addition, historical and geographical factors combined in such a way as to render the cost to the U.S. of maintaining a Saigon-based colonial outpost much greater than the benefits of “drawing the line.” But the international situation has changed abruptly since the fall of Saigon, when it seemed that U.S. imperialism was in decline. Less than a decade later, the U.S. is once again in a position of strength, ready to initiate yet another move to re-divide the world among the various superpowers—with

the U.S. getting the choicest cuts. In effect, the U.S. has formulated its own version of the “Brezhnev doctrine.” Quite obviously, the U.S. would be more than willing to trade Poland for El Salvador and thus exorcise both “detente” and “communist subversion” in a single blow.

The Vietnamese people fought long and hard, they sacrificed everything they had and more—and they won. So we know that victory is possible, that U.S. imperialism is not invincible. But the same forces now arrayed against the people of El Salvador are more powerful, and more determined, than ever before. Whether a nationalist revolution against the tiny neo-feudal elite—which has seized the land and the state to maintain its 200-year old rule—can win depends on two factors.

political formation opposed to the junta—is not much different than the program of some European social democratic party. They want to nationalize “the entire banking and financial system,” as well as foreign commerce, electricity, petroleum refineries. In addition, they envision huge collective farms on land previously seized by neo-feudal overlords.

Of course, none of this is at all incompatible with the goals of the present junta. Indeed, most of the guerrilla’s platform has been enacted by the junta itself, thus further defusing the rebellion and confusing a war-weary people. In place of state-run collective farms, the junta has set up peasant “cooperatives” consisting mostly of ORDEN members and other paramilitary rightists, who then eradicate all local opposi-

cal promises of US aid, and where today a Polish regime besieged by dissidents is propped up by loans from US government-controlled banks—the treachery of Washington is a major obstacle. The record of the Kremlin is less consistent. In spite of loud rhetorical support given to the Vietnamese fight against US imperialism, only a negligible amount of actual military aid was actually forthcoming. Although it is true that nationalist revolutions led by pro-Moscow Communists have been victorious in Cuba and Indochina, in both cases indigenous movements had to win a military victory on their own. When Moscow does intervene, it is usually to propose—or impose—some sort of negotiated settlement, a policy more in keeping with the extreme caution which has always characterized the hide-bound Kremlin bureaucracy. But, today, even the “anti-imperialist” rhetoric has evaporated; we hear no more about the “right of national self-determination” from the Soviets. Not since the Polish crisis.

If El Salvador’s rebels had to count on aid from the USSR their cause would have been doomed from the start. More realistically, the rebels are looking to West Germany’s ruling Social Democratic party—which has a restless left wing—for assistance on the diplomatic front.

#### WHY WE SUPPORT THE REVOLUTION

Liberty was once born in a war for independence. Although the American Revolution has been betrayed and, to a large extent, reversed, the historic importance of that great event can teach the modern libertarian movement a vital lesson. If we are to avoid a “choice” between fascism and Communism, if we are to build a movement which can offer a real ideological alternative, then we must harness the unleashed power of revolutionary nationalism in the cause of liberty. This great tidal wave of discontent, of rebellion against superpower domination, is the wave of the future—if there is to be a future. Our general strategy can be summed up as follows: we must take full advantage of every opportunity to turn a national liberation struggle against a particular state into a war against all States *per se*, against the idea of statism itself. In the modern world of superpower contention—“of giants locked in combat,” as we say in the LPRC *Draft*

tion to the military regime. But this process is far from fully unfolded. The struggle between “left” and “right” versions of the same statist poison—symbolized by contention between the two big superpowers, the US and the USSR—is further complicated by a wave of revolutionary nationalism which is sweeping the Third World in much the same way it swept 18th century America. Objectively, this revolutionary tidal wave—which has swept Indochina, Iran, Africa, and Latin America, and Eastern Europe—is a threat to both superpowers. However, since the strength and extent of America’s imperial dominion far outstrips the Soviets in terms of power and influence, the US has been the main enemy of national liberation movements everywhere. Even in Eastern Europe—where Czech rebels actually believed the cyni-



Members of El Salvador’s four man ruling junta pose for photographers. Seated, from the left are Dr. Ramon Navarrete, Col. Jaime Abdul Gutierrez, President Jose Napoleon Duarte and Dr. Jose Antonio Erlich.

#### THE POLITICS OF POLARIZATION

The first factor depends on the politics of the united front FDR/FMLN, and the revolutionary process within El Salvador itself.

Any examination of El Salvadoran politics is, at first, disconcerting. The plethora of political, military, and politico-military groups—each one adorned with a formidable set of initials like ERP-PRS—is confusing, but this fragmented view of the guerrilla opposition is superficial at best. All differences between the various groups can essentially be reduced to tactical questions; ideological unity has been far easier to come by. Thus, the *Platform of the Democratic Revolutionary Government*—signed by every major El Salvadoran

## Winds of Change

*Libertarian Review’s* \$12,000 move to Washington and the hiring of Clark national campaign co-ordinator Chris Hocker as its publisher are parts of a new plan for the magazine’s future that is outlined in a fall 1980 memo, that was written by Hocker himself. The plan includes changes in LR’s content and staff that should be watched for in the months ahead.

One theme that runs throughout the memo is the supposed need to lower the intellectual level of the magazine. The target audience is “young and educated without being intellectual.” Even *Saturday Review*, a magazine not usually considered high-brow, is cited as the sort of magazine for intellectuals that LR should avoid becoming.

In this vein, LR film critic David Brudnoy is attacked in the memo for writing reviews that are too formidable for the “average reader” and writing about films the “average reader” might not go to see.

The memo bans all future inclusion of articles on culture “in the main body of the magazine.” The example cited in

the memo is Jeff Riggenbach’s February 1979 article on decadence—which, according to the memo should have been relegated to the reviews section of the magazine.

The memo also calls for cutting back and revamping LR’s “Opening Shots” section (a section of short, humorous comments on items in the news.) According to the memo, this section “now veers from very good to silly; this is because columns of this type lend themselves to desperate last-minute searches for one-paragraph zingers just to fill up the column. . . . This column should be run only when the material is uniformly good.”

Furthermore, the memo calls for ending Bruce Bartlett’s “monopoly” on writing the “Public Trough” column on the federal government and says that this need not run in “every single issue.”

The memo says the magazine requires “better-written, more focused” editorials instead of the current “last-minute ramblings constructed as the deadline approaches.”

graphics and as neglecting potential constituencies are part of the ongoing dialogue on strategy in the movement, the real failure of the *Vanguard* article lay in not focusing on my central emphasis on reform of LR’s financial management.

Sincerely,  
Leonard P. Liggio  
Associate Editor  
*Libertarian Review*

The editor replies: We direct your attention to the article “Opportunists Move Rightward (Part II)”, which appears in this issue.

Dear *Vanguard* editors:

I applaud your independent stance within the Libertarian Party and hope that your viewpoints will thrive as spurs to discussion and openness within the Party. Your recent articles concerning the actions and direction of Students for a Libertarian Society have been very perceptive of that organizations problems and will undoubtedly serve to make that group more effective. The one most important facet of your comments on SLS—and, also, in your general editorial approach—is the emphasis on the necessity for a moral dedication to the cause of human liberty. We in the LP are in danger of forgetting this.

You may be interested in informing your leaders that I and a group of similarly independent SLS members were instrumental in formulating a definite proposal on structuring the group that finally passed the SLS Convention last year. Our informal group, the “Brown Jug Caucus,” wishes to promote effective action by SLS against the much larger anti-libertarian forces seeking the minds of students. We wish to avoid all factionalism that puts itself ahead of outreach, by emphasizing petty internal conflicts over organization.

Your “Draft Program” deserves extensive discussion and contains superb analysis and rhetoric, but I wish to confine myself here to one editorial point. The phrase is often used in your articles, “the U.S. as the main danger to liberty” (in different forms). It would be far better—especially to non-libertarian readers—if this read, “the U.S. government as the main danger to liberty,” or if a mention of the State’s beneficiaries in this country is also included. A nation is no more than a group of individuals, all acting nobly or ignobly, depending upon their personal choices. Some of these choices have involved the use of State power—but most have not; and if this were not true America would never have spurred the Industrial Revolution or any political revolutions.

It is not the products of free and unfettered actions that threaten freedom—you admit this, by noting that jeans and photocopyers are more of a threat to the Soviet system than missiles. It is the *State* and its industrial/financial/intellectual cohorts that threaten freedom. This vital distinction is the glory of libertarian thought; we must emphasize it at every opportunity. To say, simply, that the “U.S.” endangers liberty repels people who have the rudi-

The memo says that the staff of LR should consist of Roy Childs as editor, Eric Scott Royce as associate editor, Jay Hilgartner as researcher, Chris Hocker as managing editor/publisher/business manager, and Kristina Herbert as office manager.

Under the proposed plan, Jeff Riggenbach and Joan Kennedy Taylor would be fired as editors, but retained as contributing writers. Managing Editor Victoria Varga is left out of the picture and presumably was to be fired as well under the plan.

The additions of Hocker and Hilgartner are said to be aimed at filling three gaps in the process by which LR is published: (1) no circulation manager, (2) no quality control, and (3) no fact-checking. Since the memo was written, Hocker has also been assigned the task of editing a new LR newsletter which Childs has nicknamed “Smear.” It is planned as a rival to *Frontlines*.

Because the proposed new staff largely already lives in Washington and because Washington is “the political center for the United States,” the memo proposes moving the editorial offices out of San Francisco and into Washington. Unmentioned in the memo, but frequently mentioned by

discontented LR staffers is the fact that Hocker owns a home in Washington, D.C., and did not wish to move.

Since the memo was written, the magazine’s offices have moved to 1320 G Street, S.E., in Washington, and Riggenbach has been demoted to West Coast editor. Thus far Taylor and Varga retain their posts, and Royce, Hilgartner, and Herbert have not been hired by LR.

In an interview with *Libertarian Vanguard* Chris Hocker explained that the memo was a first draft of a plan for a revamped LR, and that he wrote it before he had a chance to interview the then-current staff of LR. He says that the differences between the staffing proposals in the memo and LR’s current staff are the result of his learning more about the individuals involved.

The memo also makes clear that expansion beyond LR’s access to the mailing lists of the Libertarian Party and of the Clark national and local campaigns.

An effective direct-mail campaign will be necessary for LR’s future since Charles Koch has cut his subsidy to the magazine by \$30,000 in 1981, and the magazine’s revenues must cover the move to Washington and the launching

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## BACKTALK

We encourage our readers to write letters for publication in this column. All letters should be typed, double-spaced, and to the point. Send letters to: 1800 Market St., SF CA 94102.

Dear Editor:

I would like to take strong exception to the editorial which dealt with *Libertarian Review* and SLS.

If anyone was to be criticized or scrutinized about changes at LR, I really think that I am the one who should have been the object of criticism. I was the person who starting in June was attempting to have LR center on improving its financial management. The financial problems of LR and SLS are the reason for the move to Washington. This problem and the decision predated Reagan’s election. The financial management of both organizations left much to be desired, and radical redirection of the management was discussed about six months before the election.

In addition, I expressed my strong personal criticism of the strategy of LR appeal to marginal groups, or for that matter any special group, rather than clearly putting forward the libertarian position from a basis of principle. But, these were clearly identified to LR as my personal views. I have felt that while the actual articles in LR have been good, the whole use of illustrations and graphics to give a “counter-culture feeling” contributed to the poor renewal rate and limited increase in new subscriptions. At the least, having appealed to that audience for a few years without success, a new effort at identifying other potential libertarian constituencies required attention.

In addition, I have wondered why LR has not had a cover story on the heroic families who sacrifice in the face of inflation to send their children to private schools. Practical opposition to public schools seems to me the most heroic action going on in the country, and there is a large constituency of those heroic families that is open to libertarian ideas.

The management issue was central to the move. The editor, the senior editor and the managing editor are all moving to Washington. But the magazine is getting a new publisher, who lives in Washington. While my personal criticisms of LR as not being clear enough in its libertarianism, as having counterproduc-

ments of this distinction in their minds already—and who need it articulated.

Best wishes for your continued success as one of many independent voices (I hope) within our movement. Sincerely,  
Stephen Reed

The editor replies: Thanks for your thoughtful letter. We accept your criticism of our formulation regarding US government responsibility for the Cold War; it is true that we must always make it clear that it is the US government, not the US people, which is the main danger to peace and liberty in the world. Indeed, during the phony hostage “crisis,” the Iranian students were careful to make this important point. However, your opposition to factionalism *per se*—and your characterization of the substantial issues currently being debated within our movement as “petty”—is, unfortunately, a delusion especially widespread in the Libertarian Party. The primacy of “outreach,” of mass political agitation presupposes a burning interest in what we are reaching out to the public with. Do we call for “low tax liberalism” or do we seek to present libertarianism as an alternative system, a revolutionary new worldview whose time has come? This is the question facing our movement today—and it is a question that must be answered if “outreach” is going to mean something more than an empty gesture. Unfortunately, the opportunists in our movement have partially succeeded in trivializing what are in fact important issues which need to be addressed. The “Brown Jug Caucus” proposal on SLS structure—like virtually all rules democratically adopted in Convention by SLS members—has been systematically ignored by the SLS “National Office.” (See the article on the latest SLS Student Board meeting, elsewhere in this issue.)

Dear fellow libertarians: I have recently joined the LP(RC) and as a result have received a copy of your critique of the Ed Clark campaign. I am truly sorry I did not receive it during the campaign because it explained an awful lot of what I saw happening. As Jefferson County (Louisville) Chair of Clark for President, I experienced first hand the elitism of the Clark Headquarters folks.

My concern was building a party of people who understood libertarianism and who knew how to participate in the electoral process. The National organization seemed to be interested in Media coverage and money. Information and funds seemed to flow one way—from us to them. I have taken the liberty to share your analysis with several other libertarians, who like myself had not been active in the party previously, but who formed the cadre for the effort in Louisville. I agree that we are much too early in our movement to start trimming our sails in order to attract votes. If we don’t present the hard-core libertarian position, who will? Along these same lines I have just read the Cato Institutes’ new paper on taxation, “Taxation Issues of the 1980’s.” From a liber-

tarian point of view it is a disaster. It can be summarized by the following quote, “The real issue is the speed of the rise in tax obligations.” From the Heritage Foundation maybe, from a libertarian policy institute, never!

In the spirit of *critical support* I would like to offer the following thoughts. It is important to discuss frankly the tactics and strategy of our movement. It is equally important to discuss them with respect for the fact that we are all libertarians with a goal of more freedom in our time. To refer to people like Ed Clark, Ed Crane . . . in perjorative terms such as “opportunist,” or “coup d’etat” serves to cut-off dialogue not further it. These are not Johnny-come-lately’s who are trying to seize our party from us. These are founding fathers of the party. While we can disagree with their actions, and in several specifics I do, we should not stoop to invective which paints them as enemies, rather than as misguided friends.

I look forward to your post-election analysis of where we are and where we should be going from here. Thomas A. Bogel

The editor replies: While it is true that the term “opportunist” is perjorative (at least to our editorial ear), it is also a political term which describes real political phenomena. The whole point of *A Matter Of Principle*, our critique of the Clark campaign, was to define opportunism as a consolidated trend within our movement. You are absolutely correct when you say that these are not Johnny-come-lately’s to Libertarianism. The problem, we contend, is deeply rooted in the history of the LP. It is not merely “invective” to identify the problem (opportunism) in the process of identifying a cure. If our diagnosis of the Clark campaign—and the present state of our movement—is correct, then our misguided friends are well on their way to liquidating and ultimately betraying the fundamentals of libertarianism. We agree that it would be premature, to say the least, to characterize the leading defenders of the Clark campaign as “enemies.” But the fact remains that they have, indeed, seized our party from us—or else the “low-tax liberal” Clark campaign would not have been possible in the first place.

Dear Justin,

Our new student organization at USC is organized using a new method of member control which we call “Member Equity Balloting.” I’ve enclosed a copy of our group’s constitution. You may find Article VII interesting and perhaps even useful in one or more of your own projects. Organizations put together under this scheme can be stacked up together in a network using the same procedures.

How is the LPRC organized? If either *Libertarian Vanguard* or the LPRC need more money income, a trial program using Member Equity Balloting might be in order. We have found that activists are more willing to contribute time and money when their contributions are recorded to their credit in

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# MOVEMENT UPDATE



## Opportunists Move Rightward (Part II)

A new and fascinating development in the byzantine corridors of the Charles Koch-funded Cato Institute is the adoption by Cato President Ed Crane of many of the arguments first made by Reason columnist Edith Efron in her controversial column "Warning to Constitutional Republicans" (Reason, February 1978).

This development came in an internal January 1981 memo in which Crane outlines the future course for Inquiry. Crane, who has just completed running a Libertarian Party Presidential campaign that endeavored to cultivate liberals and openly wooed the John Anderson voter, now explicitly terms the Left "anti-American." In doing so Crane groups together as "the Left" welfare-state liberals like Senator Alan Cranston with radicals like the staff of the Institute for Policy Studies, a New Left think-tank in Washington, D.C. But this is precisely the way of speaking that when used by Edith Efron sent *Libertarian Review* (of which Crane was then publisher) into a tizzy back in April, 1978.

Likewise the phrase "anti-American," which also upset many of Ms. Efron's critics three years ago, is now employed by Crane without hesitation. Crane reworks the meaning of the word "anti-American." He defines it to mean opposition to the liberty and property rights that Americans enjoy. But he like Efron chooses to use the word "anti-American"—with its patriotic punch—rather than the more prosaic "unlibertarian."

In his memo Crane also echoes Efron's view that the Left has been for

liberty "only for its allies, for its values," and this, says Crane, has given a "certain tone" to *Inquiry* "that is less anti-state than it is anti-American." Furthermore, Crane calls "pro-bureaucrat" an editorial in *Inquiry* criticizing a possible revival of the House Un-American Activities Committee.

Should fans of Edith Efron rejoice and welcome Crane to the fold? Not necessarily. Controversy is already brewing over what has led to this shift by Crane. Radical Caucus leaders claim that Crane once thought votes and influence could be found among the liberals, John Anderson supporters, and *New York Times* writers, now, after the election, Crane thinks—according to these Radical Caucus leaders—that votes and influence (and possibly additional money for Cato) in the future can be found on the Reaganite Right. In the words of one Radical Caucus member: "This is how I would sum up Ed Crane today—left opportunism plus right opportunism equals total opportunism."

A more cynical long-time Cato watcher offers an alternative explanation. He maintains that Crane is "deeply scornful" of ideas and theory and says that Crane values ideas only "as weapons" in power struggles. He says that when Crane was rising to power within the Libertarian Party he "used a leftist stick" to beat upon his more conservative rivals who had founded the party. Now after returning to Cato after a prolonged absence from January through November 1980, Crane is simply—according to this observer—using a "rightist stick" to whip his staff into line. □

Program—this is the extent of our leverage, and the only hope for liberty.

When a civil war erupts in El Salvador, when a popular war for national independence against US domination breaks out all over Central America, US libertarians have a responsibility to oppose any US intervention in El Salvador or US military aid to the local government. We also call for the military defeat of the brutal El Salvador junta and the right-wing death squads that are allied with the government.

But we recognize that the main guerrilla forces are dominated by Marxist-Leninists and we cannot give uncritical support to Marxist-led movements. Our perspective is thus substantially different from the stand taken by Roy A. Childs, Jr. in *Libertarian Review*—which is an *apologia* for the guerrillas. "One does not have to be a Marxist-Leninist to oppose rampant slaughter," writes Childs—but, in fact, Childs acknowledges in the same article that the guerrillas are substantially to the left of El Salvador's Communist party. (In addition, Childs asserts that Marti, the leader of the 1932 uprising, was a member of the Socialist party—in fact, he was a leading member of the Communist party, although quite unorthodox in his views.) The *Libertarian Review* article then goes on to say that: "The guerrillas are not Marxist-Leninists, although some of them are."

Unlike *Libertarian Review* and the opportunist wing of our movement, we do not resort to vague equivocations and soft evasions when evaluating just what it is we are supporting. We openly acknowledge what is apparent to everyone but Roy Childs: the leadership of the FDR/FMLN is indisputably Marxist-Leninist. Politically, the united front is dominated by avowed Communists; although Childs points out that two members of the central coordinating council are "moderates," we point out that the rest of its members are all Marxist-Leninists of one type or another. Militarily, the Marxist-Leninists provide the backbone of the guerrilla army.

All this is undeniable, in spite of *Libertarian Review's* attempt to overplay the importance of Social Democrats like Guillermo Ungo, dissident Christian Democrats, and the apparatus of the Roman Catholic Church. The role of the Roman Catholic Church, in particular, seems to be rapidly changing. After the death of the anti-government Roman Catholic Archbishop Romero, his probable successor shows every sign of capitulating to pressure from the Vatican to stay out of politics (i.e. let the junta rule.) The new Archbishop has been particularly critical of the Roman Catholic legal services office, which has been instrumental in publicizing the exact details of the many cases involving "death squad" attacks on priests and nuns, as well as children under 12. Reportedly, the legal services office of the Church is soon to be abolished by order of Romero's conservative successor.

In fact, if all the actual Social Democrats in El Salvador were to line up, it wouldn't be enough for even a small parade. The dissident Christian Democrats Childs talks about—characteristically exaggerating their importance—are called the Social Christian party.

They split with Duarte when liberal elements in the military were purged from the current "moderate" right-wing regime, and joined the FDR. They are even smaller than the Social Democrats, although they have some slight influence in the Army.

It is certainly true that middle class, so-called "moderate" political formations are less influential in El Salvador than they were and are in Nicaragua. Whatever legitimately "moderate" elements exist went over to the FDR/FMLN after the "restructuring" of the junta in January, 1981. In Nicaragua there is a strong democratic opposition to the new Marxist elite and a relatively strong private sector; forces genuinely independent of US imperialism—at least, so far—like Alfonso Robelo's Nicaraguan Democratic Movement [See *Libertarian Vanguard*; November/December 1981; "Nicaragua: The Bluefields Rebellion"] continue to carry on in the face of official repression. But in spite of *Libertarian*

ress of the revolutionary movement, and the guerrilla army is in retreat.

The possibility of a negotiated settlement—raised by Ungo and his Social Democratic friends in West Germany and elsewhere—is not yet a realistic option for the FDR/FMLN. Only one thing will force the imperialists to make the kind of concessions such negotiations would make necessary: FDR/FMLN victories on the field of battle. The junta's promises of "free elections" must be treated with the contempt they deserve. How many times have we heard this in the past—and how many times has the El Salvadoran military and allied "death squads" prevented elected officials from taking office? In fact, Jose Napoleon Duarte—the civilian figurehead "President" who serves as a reformist facade for the rightist junta—was himself deposed after winning a Presidential election held in 1972. [See *Libertarian Vanguard*; February/March 1981; p. 9.]

The people of El Salvador have no



F.P.L. guerrillas.

*Review's* attempt to imply that El Salvador is essentially another Nicaragua, we must repeat that the situation in El Salvador has certain unique characteristics. The polarization process is certainly far more advanced in El Salvador than it ever was in Nicaragua. In El Salvador, even more than in Nicaragua, the non-Communist parties are made up exclusively of intellectuals and a few students. Although in Nicaragua the influence of opposition groups like the Nicaraguan Democratic Movement of Alfonso Robelo are widespread, El Salvador has no parallel phenomenon. In El Salvador there is only the choice between a united front dominated by the Marxist-Leninist left and U.S. imperialism.

Indeed, this is one reason for the failure of the guerrillas to successfully launch a "final offensive." The fear of Communism in El Salvador is almost as widespread as the fear of ORDEN, and the FDR/FMLN has so far failed to achieve the kind of broad unity and active popular support which isolated Nicaragua's Somoza and eventually led to his downfall. Thus, the Marxist-Leninists act as a brake on the prog-

choice: they must either overthrow the junta, or face another 1932-style slaughter. There can be no moral or political neutrality in a battle of this kind. If we must temporarily join forces with Marxist-Leninists to fight the junta and its US supporters, then so be it. As far as the people of El Salvador are concerned, anything is better than a right-wing junta propped up by US imperialism.

A victory for the revolution in El Salvador would be a major defeat for US imperialism—the main danger to peace and liberty—right in Washington's own back yard. On a world scale, such an event would be an inspiration to national liberation movements everywhere, and would objectively strengthen the movement for national self-determination which is a threat to both superpowers.

### UNITED FRONT AGAINST US IMPERIALISM

The second factor necessary for the defeat of US imperialism in El Salvador is a determined effort on the home front to bring the struggle against the

junta right into the imperial heartland. Although we should have no illusions about the nature or limitations of such a struggle—although we realize that, ultimately, the victory or defeat of the liberation movement depends on what happens in El Salvador itself—a mass movement against American intervention in El Salvador here in the US can have a tremendous effect on the course of the battle.

But if large sections of the American Left have their way, a united front, single-issue opposition to Reagan's war drive—the only kind of broad, unified movement which can concretely stop US aid and expose US government propaganda lies—will never develop. Recent actions called by the national Committee Against Registration and the Draft—originally devoted exclusively to anti-militarism and specifically against US policy in El Salvador and the draft—have been taken over by the Trotskyist Workers World Party (WWP), a group which calls for the bloody suppression of the Polish workers revolt by the Red Army, and which engaged in violent provocations during the anti-war marches of the 60's. In addition, a whole zoo of leftist grouplets—like the Socialist Workers Party, which has abruptly switched its single-issue tactic in the aftermath of the Reagan victory, opportunistly tailing after a few pet union bureaucrats—is attempting to link the movement against intervention in El Salvador with opposition to tax cuts and budget cuts.

Although members of the Workers World Party in San Francisco did not fully succeed in preventing debate during the first organizing meeting of the May 3rd anti-war/anti-draft demonstration, they did succeed in ramming through a whole host of sectarian "demands"—on everything from Reagan's budget to "sexism"—which have nothing to do with US intervention in El Salvador or the draft. Libertarian Party Radical Caucus members argued that to build a coalition on anything other than a single-issue basis was, at this crucial juncture of the El Salvadoran revolution, an act of criminal sectarianism. The arrogance and cynicism of the ultra-leftists was demonstrated when LPRC members were prevented from speaking, constantly interrupted by the self-appointed chairman of the meeting, and finally effectively and pointedly excluded from the preparations for May 3rd. While the white American left uses the struggle in El Salvador for its own obscure purposes and watches from the sidelines, the people of El Salvador are being slaughtered by the thousands.

Sooner or later the anti-war movement is going to have to operate on a single issue basis. For the sake of the El Salvadoran people, who are now facing the most dire emergency, we hope it is sooner rather than later.

It is interesting to note that, after speaking out on every conceivable—from Reagan's budget cuts to "sexism"—the May 3rd Coalition failed to go on the record favoring a military victory for the rebel forces. Considering the fact that the May 3rd demonstration is supposed to focus on the issue of El Salvador, we find this omission especially perplexing. When seen in the context of

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## The Fall of Austria

The penny wise and pound foolish approach of Charles Koch and his associate George Pearson has effectively wrecked the Austrian economics program painstakingly built up since the mid-1970s at New York University.

The event which touched off the collapse was the denial of tenure at NYU to young Austrian economics superstar Gerald O'Driscoll in mid-December 1980. With faculty jobs at NYU now clearly deadends for Austrians rather than routes to professorships with tenure, other young rising lights in Austrian economics—like Jack High, Roger Garrison, and Larry White—will

surely avoid the place. In addition, Mario Rizzo, another highly talented young Austrian, who now has an untenured post at NYU, is sure to leave as soon as he can find a safe berth elsewhere. Rizzo is currently a visiting professor at the University of Chicago.

With O'Driscoll and Rizzo gone and no new blood coming in, the Austrian program at NYU will drop to a much lower level. The situation will revert to the status quo of 1975 with only Israel Kirzner full-time and the elderly Ludwig Lachmann part-time presenting the Austrian perspective—and no hope of

improvement. The \$500,000 in fellowships that had been attracted to NYU by the growth of the Austrian faculty there will now wither away.

How did this disaster happen? It happened because George Pearson decided not to supply O'Driscoll with a part-time grant that would keep him off the NYU payroll and hence postpone the decision on his tenure until next year.

Pearson refused the grant—and veteran Koch-watchers have assured us that on a move of this importance Pearson would have to clear it with Charles Koch—despite clear statements by Kirzner, the senior Austrian at NYU, that internal departmental politics plus the crush of tenure decisions this year made it imperative to put off a faculty vote on tenure for O'Driscoll.

Pearson also did not come through with the grant despite having promised it to O'Driscoll.

Instead of spending the money to sustain the Austrian program at NYU, Pearson spent it to provide fellowships at George Mason University in Virginia—at a school with a much lower academic reputation than NYU's and in an economics department with a much shakier commitment to teaching in the Austrian tradition. Pearson is the sole gatekeeper—through his role as head of the little-known Foundation for Advanced Studies in Liberty—of almost all monies in the entire United States going into the study of Austrian economics. □

## Cato Split



Bob Formaini



David Boaz

Cato Institute's morale and work has been seriously disrupted by a feud between its president Ed Crane and Bob Formaini, the institute's vice president who ran the show while Crane was in Washington managing the Clark for President campaign.

Problems started literally the first day Crane was back, when he refused to give Formaini the substantial raise he asked for. (Formaini's grounds for asking: he successfully steered the Institute through an IRS investigation and also finished under budget for the first time in Cato history.)

Furthermore, Crane immediately informed Formaini that Clark campaign operative David Boaz would be brought aboard at \$25,000 per year to take over the operation of Policy Report as well as to steer Cato in a more policy-oriented direction.

The dispute has continued ever since; for over a month the two men absolutely refused to speak to one another and communicated only

through massive—and bitterly sarcastic—memos. Crane has attacked nearly all of Formaini's programs, criticizing everything from a proposed First Amendment symposium run in conjunction with the Playboy Foundation right down to the names that Formaini gave the different Cato monograph series.

At the heart of the dispute is Crane's intention to make Cato a more policy-oriented operation, cranking out analyses that can be used by Libertarian Party candidates, many of whom are Crane's proteges and political allies within the libertarian movement. Formaini believes that this course will eventually run afoul of the IRS, will eventually strain the Institute's financial resources, and prevent Cato from ever attaining intellectual respectability. Formaini maintains that more academic programs, like his scholarly *Cato's Journal* which is now in preparation, well as academic conferences and seminars, are needed to give the libertarian

movement a solid theoretical base.

The dispute within Cato over policy analysis versus scholarship goes back a long way. David Theroux's departure from Cato (see *Frontlines*, September 1979) was early fallout from this dispute. In mid-September 1980, the proponents of a more scholarship-oriented Cato (Leonard Liggio, Ralph Raico, Formaini, Ronald Hamowy, and Murray Rothbard) met in Dallas to draw up plans to strengthen Cato's scholarly work. Formaini and Hamowy then went on to Wichita to present the group's conclusions to Charles Koch. Crane has always viewed this meeting and efforts to push Cato in a more scholarly direction as plots against him personally.

Formaini in turn has accused Crane of transforming Cato into a welfare program for "LP hacks" who are in-between elections.

Crane, for his part, complains that Formaini did practically no promotion of Cato programs while Crane was away and seriously botched several efforts. Crane boasts that he "totally redesigned" the proposal for the First Amendment conference; he felt that Formaini's proposal included far too many non-libertarians, like Ernest van den Haag and Victor Marchetti. (Formaini responds by noting that Playboy backed off the proposal after Crane redesigned it and hence the whole project was needlessly delayed for months.)

Crane also disdains Formaini as a useless academic. He responded to a Formaini memo outlining the year's planned conferences by sneering: "You just can't stop yourself, can you, Bob?"

You just can't keep from using that academic language."

Formaini has been equally sharp with Crane. "I am not a stock clerk, and I expect to be treated in a manner consistent with my position and abilities," he wrote Crane at one point.

A major focus of Formaini's discontent has been the hiring of Boaz, which was presented to Formaini as a *fait accompli*, along with the news that Boaz would answer directly to Crane. "I am concerned about Boaz for several reasons," Formaini wrote Crane at one point. "He is not qualified for a policy job at Cato, in my opinion. Whatever problems may develop because of this will be magnified if he reports directly to you."

Boaz was hired to produce policy analyses. Crane has told Formaini that Boaz will produce twenty of them, even though Cato's board of directors budgeted only for four.

Formaini is concerned that this, along with other extravagant Crane programs, will result in financial disaster for Cato. Crane's first promotional activity on his return, for example, was to throw a cocktail party back in Washington where copies of Peter Ferrara's book for Cato on social security were given away. Estimated cost: over \$10,000. Cato will have to sell several thousand of the \$20 books just to break even.


Formaini also believes that much of what Crane wants to produce at Cato will only duplicate publications already being generated by the American Enterprise Institute and other conservative policy institutions. □



In Oregon, thousands march against US intervention and the brutality of El Salvador's junta.



Jimmy "Moli" Stevens



## Counter-revolution In Paradise by Sarah E. Foster

"We are not a racist society and it is for this reason that the emblem of Nagriamel includes not only our traditional plants, but also the black and white handshake . . . for persons of all races. We will cooperate with those people of other races who now live in the islands and we ask them to stay here and help us develop our country in freedom and peace. We also extend this handshake to anyone else who is genuinely interested to come here and work for our mutual benefits. But those who would come here to spread racial hate and totalitarianism of any kind are not welcome. We want to have the symbol of our people, the handshake, as a flag among the other nations of the world, and as a sign of harmony and good will to all."

Jimmy "Moli" Stevens  
President, Nagriamel Federation  
April, 1979

The attempt is over. Jimmy Stevens, and other leaders of the free market rebellion in the New Hebrides, have been captured and tried. On November 21, 1980, Stevens received his sentence. Fourteen years in prison, and a fine of \$30,000. There were eleven charges. Basically they involved rebelling and leading a secessionist movement against the established government. Stevens pleaded guilty to all but one of the charges, destruction of property—but was convicted of that as well. Now everyone could relax. It had been generally agreed—by the colonial authorities, white missionaries, and the western press—that

he must be defeated. And at last he was. But it was not because the ideology of the opposition has gripped the hearts and minds of the people. Stevens was defeated by raw physical force, delivered first by the British, then by Papua New Guinea (PNG) and Australia. Australia attempts to justify involvement by claiming intervention was in response to a request for aid from a friendly government—which is how the Soviet Union justifies the invasion of Afghanistan.

Although the actual rebellion lasted only a few months, the real struggle had been going on for twenty years. For much of that time Stevens had withstood ridicule and sarcasm in the press, vilification from the pulpit, government repression and violence directed against himself, his followers, and their property. However, there was no way he could hold out against troops and weapons from PNG. At least, not for long—not without weapons of his own. It was a disgraceful show of force against a people who wanted no conflict, only the right to go their way in peace—and the "mopping up" of pockets of secessionist resistance has been brutal.

The New Hebrides is a small group of 115 tropical islands, 850 miles north-east of Australia. They are part of the great culture area of Melanesia, which includes New Guinea and New Caledonia as well. They were due to become independent on July 30, 1980, following a decade of agitation and unrest on the part of the indigenous people. Since 1906, these islands had been "managed" by Great Britain and France, through a system unique in the Colonial world—a "condominium" government, often called a "pandemonium." Everything was double. There were two postal systems, two court systems (plus a native one), two official languages, two Resident Commissioners to oversee things, and so on. The competition between the two resulted in a certain amount of government "inefficiency," which is not in

itself a bad thing—but unfortunately there was complete accord on a couple of important matters. Both British and French were perfectly happy with the mandated *maximum* wage of \$2.00 (Australian) per day for native workers. While there was no income tax, import and export duties were exorbitant. So with slave wages, and the price of consumer goods inflated by tariffs, it was virtually impossible for New Hebrideans to raise their standard of living to any degree—unless they went to work for the government.

During the preceding years, two native leaders had emerged, representing two extremes of the political spectrum. On one side was Jimmy Stevens, a tribal chief or "moli," with a long history of opposition against the colonial powers. On the other side was Walter Hadye Lini (37), a socialist and an Anglican priest, who had been brought by the British from his ministry on the island of Aoba, and encouraged to develop a political party which would destroy Stevens.

Lini had consolidated his control, and a government of which he was to be leader, was to take over in late July when the British and French pulled out. But on May 28, Stevens staged a coup. With 600 New Hebridean followers, and 50 sympathetic French planters, he marched into Luganville, on the south coast of Espiritu Santo, and arrested the District Commissioner, the Chief of Police, and eight policemen. These, and some captured riot police, were released unharmed, a couple of days later.

Stevens announced the establishment of a new nation, Vemarana, which would be comprised of the northern islands, including Espiritu Santo, largest island in the Group. This was a declaration of independence, not from Britain and France—who were leaving anyway—but from the New Hebridean (Vanuatu) government to be established in their place. It was brought out later at Stevens' trial that the French government had promised assistance to Stevens if he went ahead with the secession but, in the end, Nagriamel was betrayed, the French reneged, and the rest is history.

Reporters flocked to Luganville to cover the story. But there was unofficial screening. Stevens was a free-market rebel, a believer in individual rights, and Vemarana was to be a country based on these principles. Nagriamel was quite explicit: the word "libertarian" was used to describe the young movements politics. As a result, news coverage of the situation and of Stevens was demeaning and sarcastic. One sympathetic Australian, Michael Darby, arrived with a passport granting him entry. He never made it to Luganville. He was stopped at the airport upon arrival at Port Vila, the capitol, and thrown in jail for the night. Next day he was sent back to Sydney. The fact that he edits a magazine called *Free Market*, asserts Darby, just might have had something to do with it.

Now the media reps that did make it to Luganville treated the affair as a joke, with a not too thinly concealed contempt for "the natives," and their leader. A great deal was made of Stevens' lack of formal education, but consistently overlooked was his record of opposition to the colonial powers which goes back thirty-five years. It is a record to be proud of—a record of struggle and achievement—and it may well be that the defeat of Jimmy Stevens will someday be regarded as one of the great tragedies of Melanesian history, as his victory would have been a triumph.

### WHO IS JIMMY STEVENS?

James Toupou "Moli" Stevens, was born about 1922 of Polynesian, Melanesian, and European ancestry. His grandfather, Thomas Stevens, was a Scottish seaman who had come to the South Pacific in the 1890's, married a Tongan woman, and eventually settled with her in the New Hebrides. One of their sons was Jimmy's father who married a New Hebridean. When Jimmy was a child his parents worked on plantations in the islands, and as he grew up he observed first hand the worst features of colonialism—the theft by Europeans of the New Hebrideans' cattle, the raiding of their subsistence gardens, and the seizure of their lands. By the time he was in his late teens he was organizing resistance activities. Once he was captured by the British and subjected to forced labor on one of the plantations. A girl who smug-

gled him a file, which enabled him to escape, was traced and beaten to death. He was seventeen at the time.

During World War II he worked for the US Seabees who were building the huge naval base at Luganville. From them he learned to speak English, and to handle heavy equipment. This was important, for it was not customary for white colonialists to instruct "natives" in the use of complicated machinery. New Hebrideans were used primarily as unskilled labor on the plantations. Working with Americans must have also brought home another message to Stevens: many of the Seabees and Navy personnel were black—yet they were doing the same jobs as their white co-workers. It's ironic that the American military, segregated as it was, was better than anything Stevens had ever witnessed. That's a damning indictment of the entire colonial system—despite all the racist talk of helping, and doing "what's right for the natives."

After the War, Stevens worked at various jobs, including bull-dozer operator and engineer on a trading ship.

He became a "Big Man" (Custom chief or "Moli") in 1963. Being a "Big Man" is usually not an inherited position in Melanesian society. Status is achieved, and you earn it by passing through a series of defined ranks, which are based on the accumulation and distribution of certain kinds of wealth (livestock, produce, etc.). A man is respected not only by what he owns, but by what he gives away at the ceremonies. Production of certain commodities—such as pigs—is limited by custom, for the idea is to acquire these as loans and gifts. That provides proof that a number of people in a community stand behind you. If a man wished to rise in the rank system, he must possess qualities which others admire, then his friends and relatives will cooperate in his advancement by helping him secure the necessary goods. In Stevens case, not having relatives in the area, he was adopted by a "Big Man" (a common practice in Melanesia) and taught the ways of custom. Political power in such a system is very limited, and a moli's authority does not usually extend beyond his village—unless, as with Stevens, other big men select him as their spokesman. Stevens owes his political and social position to his relationship with New Hebrideans at the village level—a relationship he has worked hard to achieve and maintain.

It has to be realized that in all this ritual exchange and status seeking, women have no real part. Though not particularly unique in this aspect, Melanesian culture is definitely "male chauvinist." On a scale of one to ten I'd give it three. Stevens and the Nagriamel movement evidently tried to change this, at least to a degree. Women had the right to vote in the elections, and the right to hold land.

### THE ORIGINS OF NAGRIAMEL

Nagriamel was begun in the early 1960's by Stevens and an old friend, Bulok Paul. Bulok, a moli from northern Espiritu Santo, claimed land rights in the central part of the island. The Societe Francaise des Nouvelles Hebrides (SFNH), largest land holder in the Group, had been fencing in large areas of native land (the "Dark Bush") to provide pasture for cattle. In *New Hebrides: The Road to Independence* (1977), Stevens tells his account:

"There were big problems in the country, especially the land problem between the white and black people . . . the blackmen recognized that they had no power at all to protect their own land. White men were making profit from the land, that the black people were not getting anything from it. Many black people had been to school, but they didn't really want to wake up, to support Man Bush. I don't understand their reasons very well, but these Christian and educated people didn't want to support Man Bush. . . . In 1960 I lived in Luganville, and when I tried to hold meetings with the natives, the British and French told me to get out fast, that I was causing a revolution or something. . . . At that time the bush people, the custom people, told me I must do something to hold on to their land. For they said that if the white man

such by all concerned. Yet we never did find out precisely why Henderson was hired, apart from being a way for Crane to impose his will against almost unanimous advice. But in the course of inquiry into the Henderson Affair, we discovered several fascinating and horrifying festering sores underneath the surface of Cranedom. A mighty can of worms was now uncovered.

First we all found to our astonishment that the only person strongly advising Crane to hire Henderson was Roy A. Childs, Jr. Not only did Childs have no official post at Cato but Childs knew zilch about economics. So how did he come to be picking Cato's economists? What was going on here? What was the Crane/Childs connection?

Deeper trauma ensued. For at this point we heard the following incredible story from a top member of the Crane/Childs cabal who suddenly defected and was promptly removed from Cato:

The essence of the story was this. Crane, and Childs as his Court Intellectual and apologist, began to discover a rising tide of opposition to Cato's emergence within the Libertarian Party. Crane had finally succeeded, by early February, in inducing Ed Clark to run for President, and the mighty Clark vs. Hunscher race for the nomination was now underway. But how could Clark win and, more important, how could Crane run his campaign, if Hunscher could run successfully as the anti-Cato candidate within the Party? A scapegoat would have to be found.

In addition and more importantly, Crane/Childs decided on a critical paradigm shift for the Libertarian Party and for the movement as a whole. Crane and his institutions—*Libertarian Review* and Students for a Libertarian Society had previously been committed to pure, radical libertarian principle. This would now have to be diluted and scrapped, and a paradigm shift made to water down principle and sell out in behalf of big numbers: money, media influence, and votes. The Clark campaign, once he was successfully nominated, would be the embodiment of the new sellout opportunism within the Party.

The first fruits of the new Cranian opportunism was a shift in the line of LR and SLS on nuclear power in the summer of '79, which was not an isolated issue but the beginning of the end of Cranian adherence to libertarianism. (Or rather, the real beginning was the Henderson appointment, which, according to the Cranian defector, was a move away from Austrianism and laissez-faire and toward the more respectable Friedmanite economics. In one case Friedmanism, in the other low-tax liberalism! All parts of the new paradigm would hang together.

Also, said our defector, the planned scapegoat for Crane/Childs was myself and my associates, particularly Bill Evers. Personal friction had arisen between Crane and Evers the previous year. As publisher of *Inquiry*, Crane was responsible for the business end of the magazine. When *Inquiry* began to face mounting deficits because of Crane's mismanagement, he conveniently placed the blame on Evers who, though the editor-in-chief, had not even been allowed to have a copy of the magazine's budget. In addition, Childs had had a deep personal antipathy to Evers for a long time, to the extent of chanting publicly as well as privately "Death to Evers" at every opportunity. There seemed to be no objective reason for Childs' malevolent obsession with Evers, and here we are in the murky area of psychopathology. The best judgment of objective observers put the blame on a deep-seated envy of Evers: the two were the same age and both had been libertarians for a long time.

The friction and antagonism were there, and to top it off, Evers and myself were, no doubt about it, theoretical purists, quick to denounce deviations from libertarian principle. So we, and particularly Evers, were to be selected as scapegoats. According to our defector, Childs was deputized by Crane to spend virtually full time calling up LP mem-


bers across the country and denouncing Evers and myself as doctrinaire purists, thereby deflecting anti-Cato fire to ourselves, and also paving the way for future sellouts.

That, said our intrepid defector, was the plan, and it was being carried out. Evers would eventually be kicked out, and I would be quietly shifted from any decision-making role to being exploited as a resource-person and general totem. True, all too true, with the exception that I didn't go quietly.

This story hit me like a sledgehammer. I couldn't believe it. Surely it couldn't be true! Surely my informant had cracked under what would eventually become the well-known Cato syndrome? I knew about the Evers/Crane friction, but Crane and I had always gotten along, and Childs had been one of my closest friends for many years. I thought, Say it ain't true, Roy! So I proceeded to ask around. Did such a cabal exist? The more I found out the more our defector's story was amply confirmed. The moment of truth came when I confronted Childs and asked him point-blank. Childs, who had begun to affect a steely-eyed look, presumably adopted from his mentor, Crane, in essence confirmed the defector's story. Childs' odious pronouncement ended the conversation: "The trouble with you is you're too loyal to your friends [i.e. Evers]."

The Great Cato Rift had begun.

Photo/Jonnie Gilman



Rothbard leaving Cato Institute after being expelled from its Board of Directors.

### EPILOGUE: IT USUALLY ENDS. . .

So that's it. Another Crane dissenter has become his victim and been purged from Cato. But how many Pyrrhic victories will this man be able to sustain? How long will this be permitted to go on?

The last word on all this was recently sent to me by an old friend and ex-Cato bigwig. He wrote: "Murray, when you write your book or article on the history of the libertarian movement of the 1980's, why don't you entitle it: *It Usually Ends With Ed Crane?*" □

Murray N. Rothbard, a well-known economist, is the author of *Man, Economy and State, For a New Liberty, the multi-volume *Conceived in Liberty (a history of the American Revolution), and many others. He is the leading exponent of the Austrian school of economics, at least in this country — and was a pupil of the great Ludwig von Mises. Professor Rothbard has been a leader of the Libertarian movement for many years. He is also a member of the LPRC Central Committee.**

### WINDS OF CHANGE

continued from page 21  
of "Smear," as well as LR's regular costs of publishing.  
The memo claims that LR is the

## BECOME A LIBERTARIAN VANGUARD SUSTAINER!

Will Ronald Reagan discredit the free market by associating it with militarism? Will "Low-Tax Liberalism" become a substitute for true libertarianism, as the opportunists in our movement rush to tail after the latest political fad?

The rise of the rightwing—from the Reagan victory, to the "Moral Majority" assault on civil liberties, and the "pro-life" campaign to outlaw abortions—is the single biggest threat to our movement. It means that we will have to fight even harder to preserve the integrity of our own movement at a time when a conservative administration is getting ready to intervene in the Third World—and at a time when opportunists in our own movement are busy tailing after the conservatives. In the aftermath of Reagan's victory — after Ed Clark's sell-out "low-tax liberal" campaign on behalf of the LP — it is more essential than ever before to preserve and expand the gains made by Libertarian Vanguard since 1979. For almost three years Libertarian Vanguard has published analysis of world events, national news, and news of the libertarian movement itself from a radical libertarian perspective. Our uniqueness and our willingness to cover areas ignored by other libertarian periodicals has won us a wide readership and influence. It is vitally important that we continue to expand and improve the newspaper's content and influence—especially now, when the rise of the ultra-right is becoming more than merely ominous. You can help build the radical libertarian movement as an independent political force by:

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
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Edward H. Crane, III

## It Usually Ends With Ed Crane by Murray N. Rothbard

*Author's Note: On Black Friday, March 27, 1981, at 9:00 A.M. in San Francisco, Edward H. Crane III revealed once again his true nature and his cloven hoof. Crane ordered me to leave Cato's regular quarterly board meeting, even though I am a shareholder and a founding board member of the Cato Institute. Crane's action was not only iniquitous and high-handed but also illegal, as my attorneys informed me before and during the meeting. He didn't care. What's more, Crane literally expropriated and confiscated the shares which I had naively left in Cato's Wichita office for "safekeeping," an act clearly in violation of our agreement as well as contrary to every tenet of libertarian principle. The details of this villainy and how it transpired, I will recount in a forthcoming issue of the Libertarian Forum.*

When Cato was first founded in 1976, transformed from what was previously the Charles Koch Foundation, I accepted a post as a founding board member with enthusiasm. Here was what the libertarian movement seemed to need—a well-funded organization that would gather to itself the Best and the Brightest in the movement, find new and able libertarians, and then advance sound and radical libertarian principles and their applications in the real world.

But that, alas, was only the theory. For while Cato has done many good things, the reality of the Cato Institute was unfortunately all too different. And much of that difference can be laid squarely at the door of its President, Ed Crane.

It has been well said that, after a while, the feel and spirit of any organization takes on the coloration of its head. Since I worked at Cato in San Francisco for virtually the first two and a half years of its existence, I was able to confirm this insight first-hand at Cato, and also to find out what the Cato spirit might be. After the first few months, it became all too clear that the dominant spirit at the Cato Institute was one of paranoia, intense hatred, backstabbing, and endless crises. At first, the crises, all revolving around personal relations between Crane and other Cato executives, occurred only once every few months. But soon the frequency accelerated, until crises occurred once a week, and then every day or two. I have noted for a long time that the logo of the Cato Institute should be the closing door, because if you talk to anyone at Cato about anything except the weather, he or she will say, "Wait a minute, let me close the door."

The atmosphere at Cato is reminiscent of nothing so much as the last days of the Nixon White House. Everything is covered over with layers of secrecy; one of Crane's favorite phrases is the mania at Cato that a large part of the time the "who" was Crane himself. Usually, there is at least one hate-object for Crane among his top executives. Crane and the executive will stop talk-

ing to each other for many months, even years, and, while the executive in question twists slowly, slowly in the wind (to use a favorite Watergateism), Crane will organize hate sessions against the unfortunate victim among his coterie of fawning toadies. All this is all too reminiscent of the "hate Emanuel Goldstein" sessions in Orwell's 1984, in which Goldstein's face is flashed on the screen and everyone is expected to heap abuse upon his image.

Finally, after many tense and excruciating months, the victim-hate object is fired or pressured out, and Crane soon finds another victim. For Crane, repeated firings of the "disloyal" has several important uses. One is that he can then blame all the incredible mismanagement and foulups at Cato on the unfortunate hate-object; sometimes, in fact, the victim is blamed for misdeeds committed months, even years after he has been booted out of Cato. Their evil, apparently, lives after them, trailing endless clouds of alibis for Ed Crane. Not only were they disloyal; they apparently engaged in endless plots against the Master. What neither Crane nor his apologists seem to understand is that if you treat everyone as if they are eternally plotting against you, pretty soon by God they will start such plotting. And so paranoia acts as a self-fulfilling prophecy.

In a magnificent burst of speaking truth to power, a top executive of Cato recently resigned (on a matter unconnected with my expulsion from the Cato Board), and wrote to Crane (on March 13, 1981): "In a movement filled with backbiting, I have seldom encountered anyone quite as ruthless or as consistently unprofessional as you. It is simply impossible for me to continue to work under someone whose greatest glory is humiliating, punishing, or purging his enemies, real or imagined, or 'getting even' with its most competent supporters and employees even at the cost of destroying his own organization. You do not seem to realize that if you treat someone as an enemy, he soon becomes one, or how easy it would have been to win the loyalty of so many of those people who now justifiably regard you with suspicion." Bravo!

Take a list of top Cato executives of the past and you will find some of the truly best and brightest people in the libertarian movement. It is a veritable drumroll:

Roger Lea MacBride, board member and shareholder  
David Theroux, vice president  
Leonard P. Liggio, vice president  
Williamson M. Evers, vice president and editor of *Inquiry*  
Ronald Hamowy, editor of *Inquiry*.

I will now add myself to what is really a roll of honor.

Where are they now? They are most emphatically *not* at Cato. Why? Because of one man and one man alone, Edward H. Crane III. We must put the blame on Crane, for that is precisely where it belongs.

There are only two choices here.

Either Crane is a John Galt figure, a giant among lesser pygmies, envied and therefore plotted against by all the rest of us creeps and low-lives. Or else: it is Crane who is out of step, and not the rest of the world. There is no middle way, no wimpy way out of the horns of this dilemma. Either all the rest of us are Bad Guys, or Crane is the Bad Guy. The movement must choose. And furthermore, if Crane is the Good Guy, how come he had the rotten judgment to select as his top executives all these people who turned out, on his own account, to be Bad Guys? What kind of top manager is that?

OK, let's stipulate that personnel relations at Cato are a walking disaster. What about other aspects of the Crane Presidency? One important function of the president of a non-profit organization is to raise funds. But Crane has shown no aptitude what-so-ever in fund-raising except from one man: The Donor. Direct mail fund-raising hasn't worked, as one might expect from an ideological organization.

How much longer will the Donor be willing to put up with this bizarre state of affairs? Who knows? But whatever happens, it remains an odd situation for an organization like Cato to have a President who can't fund-raise his way out of a paper bag.

Another function of a President is to keep costs down and preside over a tight budget. But even Crane's most fervent supporters admit that cost management is not his forte and that, instead, he spends money as if there is no tomorrow. It was only in the year that Crane was on leave to run the Clark campaign that Cato managed to live within its budget. If I had been allowed to be at the March 27 board meeting I would have raised a question, for example, about \$15,000 that Crane reportedly spent on a cocktail party in Washington to herald Pete Ferrara's *Social Security* book, a party that brought in virtually no book orders, but presumably enhanced whatever image Crane may have among the movers and shakers of the Reagan administration.

Veteran Crane-watchers, even those favorable to him, will stipulate all of this: that he is a disaster in personal relations, a nothing fund-raiser, and heedless of costs or budgets. Furthermore, they will concede another important point: that Eddie gets bored with any existing programs, and that therefore he is a lousy manager of any continuing institutions within Cato. It is this deep-seated boredom, they feel, that accounts for Crane's fascination with presidential campaigns, which are short-lived, one-shot, and exciting over their brief span.

If Crane is a disastrous manager of existing programs, he is in still other ways singularly unequipped to be the head of a libertarian public policy institute. When I first got to Cato in 1977, I was told by a top Cato officer and Crane crony that Crane despised intellectuals and libertarian theorists and that he read practically nothing, whether books, magazines, or newspapers. At first I resisted this charge, but it turned out to be all too true. The heads of other public policy think tanks may not be writers or theorists themselves, but they are often genuinely fond of scholarship and of ideas and are therefore well equipped to preside over efforts to translate them into more practical applications or more readable form. Libertarian institutions deserve no less, but clearly Crane is not the man for the job.

So—going down this grisly roll call of Crane failings, what in the world is supposed to be his forte? Why is he still in a job which, by any sensible criterion, he is so little qualified to hold? This question has wasted countless man-hours over lunch, drinks, and office chitchat at the Cato Institute. Why is this man here? All of us may guess, but no one knows the answer. However, we might as well consider the one favorable item which Crane-watchers have come up with: that he's a "good idea man," that he comes up with fruitful ideas for new projects. In short, he may not be able to run an existing institution or program, but he can come up with fruitful new ones; in a large corporation, he might have been Vice President in Charge of Development or whatever.

But even this does not really hold water. There has scarcely been a creative new idea at Cato since its first year; old programs, such as *Inquiry* and the Cato Seminars, have simply continued in place—or, in the case of *Inquiry*, stagnated. And Crane has never made a positive contribution to the contents of *Inquiry*. The best recent program, the quarterly *Cato Journal*, was not Crane's idea at all, and was instituted when he was away on leave. And the best new idea hatched at Cato in years, the concept of a Cato think tank at some university—with fellowships, resident scholars and publishing the *Cato Journal*—was shot down angrily by Crane when he returned from his campaign leave. Probably the greatest single need of the movement right now is for a scholarly university think tank to foster interdisciplinary libertarian ideas. But Crane, in his deep contempt for the human mind, squashed the idea and instead denounced those who drew it up as plotters against his reign. So much for Crane the man of ideas.

So we are left with the puzzle: why is this man here?

We come now to the final bone of contention: the interpenetration of the Cato Institute and the Libertarian Party. When I first got to Cato, I was told by several top Cato officers that the Cato Institute had turned out to be primarily an organization to funnel material and personnel into LP campaigns, to provide a resting place for Crane in between presidential races. I told them that this was ridiculous, that I was a founding board member of Cato, and that there was a key difference (which many non- or quasi-libertarians fail to understand) between libertarianism and the Libertarian Party. That Cato had nothing to do with the party—as indeed it was legally bound as a tax-exempt organization—but was simply founded to spread libertarian ideas. They smiled back knowingly and insisted they were right.

Though my own rift with Crane began in the spring of 1979, no attempt was made to remove me from the Cato board until this spring. To me it is clear that the real cause was not my *Libertarian Forum* (Sept.-Oct.) article ("The Clark Campaign: Never Again") but the success which I and others had at the November board meeting in beginning to call Crane to account. I had been a one-man needler of Crane's management at Cato board meetings for a year or more; until last November, I could be ignored as having only nuisance value, since I was just one lone voice tolerated on the board. But last November, suddenly I had two allies, almost a majority of the Cato board. Over Crane's initial opposition, I managed to carry the board resolution barring all senior Cato officers from partisan political activity, in an effort to ensure Cato's continued non-profit, tax-exempt status. Also at the board meeting we managed to set up a Salary Review Committee, to review the salaries of all the top executives—a commonplace for most boards but unheard of at Cato, where Crane prefers to run everything out of his hip pocket. It was because of this success that I had to go, and go quickly.

While all the above failings of Crane certainly played a large cumulative role, my own break with Crane came sharply in the spring of 1979. Typically, it came over matters that involved not only the Cato Institute but also the Libertarian Party and the movement as a whole.

The Sarajevo of the Cato Institute was a seemingly simple act: the hiring by Crane of Dr. David Henderson as his policy analyst and economist. The hiring of Henderson came as a thunder-clap at Cato. Why was he hired? The freestorm of opposition to Henderson that broke out among all the Cato executives was based not so much on personal hostility as on the fact that the Cato Institute was supposed to be deeply committed to Austrian economics. Yet Henderson was not only not an Austrian but strongly hostile to the Austrians. So why was he hired? Especially since all those at Cato with economic background were bitterly opposed to the appointment.

Henderson is long gone, as his appointment turned out to be yet another Crane mistake, this time admitted as

takes it all over, then we're finished. I asked them one question: What power have you got whereby we can hold on to the land? They replied that they had nothing but their traditional customs. But they didn't know how best they could utilize their custom, and looked to me for an answer."

One answer was to begin organizing what could be called "walk-ons." Bulok and Stevens simply pulled up the surveying stakes, and with groups of New Hebrideans, moved onto SFNH land. When they were eventually arrested for trespassing, Stevens did the unprecedented thing of hiring an attorney. There were no native attorneys in the Islands. New Hebrideans were not encouraged to stand up for their rights in court, and a native who ran afoul of the European criminal code, had a hearing before a judge. Stevens found a lawyer on Fiji who was willing to take the case, and who arranged for much reduced sentences (a few months) for himself and Bulok.

The original aim of Nagriamel was to get as much land as possible back into the hands of New Hebrideans, but it evolved into a movement concerned with far more than land rights. Its purpose was, according to Stevens, "to protect and preserve the cultural, ethnic, linguistic, and political rights of the indigenous people." "Nagriamel" is a word created from the names of two plants, nagria and namele, which were used in the old rituals and taboos, and chosen to symbolize the viability of Melanesian tradition. "Namele leaf is our taboo, our law, our custom. Nagria is peace for us, is our body." They also represent male and female—and when Nagriamel started in 1960, it was really just namele. But in 1963, "all the men with namele leaves, and the women with nagria leaves brought them together, and we became one voice. . . ." It was then that everyone—including women—voted for Stevens to be their spokesman, and represent them in dealings with the French and British.

To provide a headquarters for Nagriamel, Stevens founded the town of Vanafo (1966), on a fertile plateau, fifteen miles north of Luganville. Abel Bani, a native pastor of the Church of Christ on the island of Aoba, forty miles east of Espiritu Santo, was invited to open a mission. Bani was a man of great influence in the Islands—and his Church had a long-standing reputation of being "uncooperative" with the Administrations. Stevens was baptised at this time (reports say under protest), and given the name Moses.

According to Stevens, the idea of Vanafo "was to create something outside of the two governments; a small headquarters for all the native people." Emmissaries were sent to surrounding villages to tell of Nagriamel, and to invite people to visit Vanafo. There were no newspapers then in the Islands, but few New Hebrideans could read anyway—certainly not the Bush people whom Stevens wished to help. So in place of a newsletter, the emmissaries carried tape recorders and cassettes, so villagers could hear what Stevens himself had to say. Response was overwhelming. Visitors came from miles around and plots of land were allocated to whomever would stay and work. All work was done by hand, and in the first year over 125 acres had been cleared and planted. Vanafo developed into a neatly laid out village and agricultural center, and grew from an initial seven persons, in 1967, to over two hundred in just two years.

It was intended that people set up similar villages on other islands. If they wanted the bush cleared in their areas, the Nagriamel people helped them, in exchange for help at Vanafo. Several smaller communities were established in this way.

Any native New Hebridean could settle at Vanafo, but there were obligations. A newcomer presented namele or nagria leaves as a token of dedication. A single person, of either sex, was then given one and a half acres of land, a married couple, five. It was Nagriamel policy that land should not be sold, but had to be earned. An individual or couple paid a small monthly rent, and was required to work one day a week for Nagriamel. At the end of five years the rent was no longer charged. Affairs of Vanafo were handled by committees. There was also an Upper Council of four

Presidents—each with a different committee or department; and a Lower Council, made up of ten custom chiefs ("Big Men") representing different islands. Everything was run smoothly, by people with no formal training in "administration."

### STATE OF SIEGE

The authorities began to be uneasy. People were leaving the missions to go to Vanafo, or sending contributions which had formerly gone into the collection plates. The place was becoming a model community, all undirected by Europeans. A feeler was sent out. Would the Nagriamel people like the British to build them a clinic? The answer was a polite "no." It was through promises of medical care that missionaries had been able to establish a toe-hold in the Islands in the first place. Thanks—but no thanks!

The British tried to hamstring any chances of success. Export licenses were denied, preventing the marketing of crops abroad. Attempts to bring in outside teachers so that a non-government school could be established were also blocked. But still Nagriamel grew.

In the hope that whatever is ignored will go away, all news about the movement or about Stevens was suppressed. Not one word appeared about either, in any newspaper or journal, despite the fact that by 1969 Nagriamel had spread throughout the northern islands, across linguistic, ethnic, and religious boundaries, and then numbered over 20,000 members in an island group of less than 80,000 persons. But silence could not be maintained forever, and in July, 1969, an article about Stevens was published in *Pacific Islands Monthly* (*PIM*), a popular magazine widely circulated throughout the Pacific. The article, by Robert Langdon, was snide and obtuse—even mocking the signs which had been posted at Vanafo because they contained spelling errors—but at least it was an acknowledgment.

That December, in 1969, the New Hebrides Advisory Council discussed Nagriamel for the first time. The verdict of the Council—a twenty-four member non-legislative body made up of French, British and New Hebrideans—was unanimous: Nagriamel posed a significant threat to the neocolonial regime. The Resident Commissioners presented a report, saying, "Whether or not their actions were approved by their leaders was not clear but certain members of this movement have adopted attitudes or have acted in ways which are prejudicial to the public good and to the proper working of the government. . . the leaders. . . cannot be allowed to take the place of government or to obstruct the action of those who, whether they are government officers or members of voluntary agencies, are working for the good and progress of all. . ." This report was heartily approved by the Council.

*PIM*, in discussing the Council meeting (January, 1970), described Stevens as "a half-caste with a luxuriant grey beard," and added that: "Where Jimmy's views are followed, villagers generally refuse to cooperate with government officers, take their children out of school, remain sullen and speechless when faced with government people although they often remain as hospitable and helpful as ever with non-government Europeans." You can just hear the tongues clicking at *PIM* offices: "My dear, the natives are restless!"

The sudden concern of the Advisory Council and the disgustingly racist publicity in *PIM* may well have been precipitated by Stevens' decision to send a petition of grievances to the United Nations, the first New Hebridean to do so.

Although a formal petition was not presented until spring, 1971, several letters were sent to UN officials, beginning in 1968. Stevens really believed that organization would help him. One letter, of May, 1970, reads in part:

"I would like to explain again to you about the trouble in our country between European and the Native children in New Hebrides. We want our land. . . This letter comes from over 22,000 native people all in one voice. . . please sir, could you send someone to come in our country and check and

give us back our right. All our land is not for selling. It is only for his (lease). . . We want the European to pay the rent because we want to develop our own country. We can see all the Pacific islands they are now growing up. Instead of growing up—the New Hebrides is growing down."

A more detailed statement, drawn up by Steven's attorney on Fiji, was sent the following March to the UN Special Committee on Colonialism. The charge was reemphasized that European planters were trying to take over native lands. "Natives are being imprisoned and in many cases they have been terrorized off the land." Planters, Stevens claimed, were using police dogs and other methods, to drive off the indigenous people, "even when they are living in 'the long dark bush' and not harming anyone and minding their own business, and living by subsistence agriculture." He protested that the authorities had not permitted the people of Nagriamel to find a market for their many crops—ginger, taro, rice, bananas, etc. "We feel that the administration by not encouraging us to become self-sufficient, is trying to strangle our position."



Stevens further charged that no real effort was being made to educate the New Hebrideans, and that "the teaching of 'pidgin' is a short-cut and lazy method and we are not being trained to take our rightful place in the community of nations."

He requested a fact-finding mission be sent to the Islands, and that the UN conduct a direct "act of choice" on the matter of independence. If independence were favored, it was to be granted that year.

### THE RISE OF WALTER LINI

When word of the contents of this petition reached the authorities in Vila, the Advisory Council was thrown into total confusion—and anger. But every-one joined ranks. One member wondered

Nagriamel cadre.



if it wouldn't be possible to sue the attorney who had prepared the documents, and fear was expressed that the Special Committee might believe the charges. Such fears were unwarranted. The Chair of the Special Committee was Mr. Salim Salim, of the United Republic of Tanzania—talk about a bone falling among wolves! Nonetheless the Advisory Council took no chances. A resolution was passed that the Resident Commissioners send word to the UN that everything Stevens said was false. This was apparently done, for his case was carefully set aside. One wonders what other information was sent about him. He wasn't the first person from a Third World country to make such allegations, but he must be one of the only ones to be snubbed as he was.

It was clear something had to be done—and fast. In August, 1971, the New Hebrides Culture Association was founded, which within two months had mutated into the National Party (NP), a name it held until 1977 when it was changed again, to the Vanuaaku ("Our Land") Party (VP). A published manifesto announced the group's purpose was "to promote, preserve, to revive and to encourage New Hebridean culture. . ." All very similar to Nagriamel. But the unwritten, primary aim, according to its president, Aiden Garae, was to counter Jimmy Stevens and Nagriamel. "Nagriamel is anti-government," said Garae. "What we want is to try and guide the government." The NP was centered, not in Port Vila, capitol of the Islands and the hub of whatever governmental activities might need "guiding," but in Luganville, conveniently close to Vanafo. The NP began a quarterly periodical, *New Hebridean Viewpoints*, and Walter Lini was the first editor.

Lini and his friends began building a political machine. They staged demonstrations and took an active part in "guiding" the affairs of the Islands. Organizers called "commissars" were sent to the villages to undercut Stevens'

*continued on page 8*



continued from page 7

grassroots support. The NP tried to preempt many Nagriamel issues—land rights, independence, Melanesian heritage, etc. The rhetorical device adopted was to criticize, not government actions, but non actions. The problems of the New Hebrides were blamed on the inefficiency of the Condominium system. What was needed was not only independence, but a strong central government, like that of Tanzania, which Lini, after visiting that country, declared was his model for the New Hebrides.

By 1973 the NP was a formidable organization. In August, it began to petition the United Nations, and Lini was sent to New York in person. (And who paid for that little junket? There he was received most courteously, and as might be expected, the authorities in Vila finally agreed to permit a fact-finding mission to visit the Islands. Financial backing came from a number of diverse sources: the Australian trade unions, the British and Australian Labour Parties, the Anglican Church, the Presbyterian Church and probably other sympathetic groups. After Lini and Fred Timakata, now Minister of Home Affairs—but then, a Presbyterian pastor—dropped by at the Geneva Headquarters of the World Council of Churches (in 1976), the WCC voted them \$10,000 to fight "racism."

Lini's rapport with the British is not surprising. He is a product of their schools and missions. As a priest turned politician, he is a perfect representative of the Europeanized native elite which owes its very existence to the civil service and to the Protestant churches, which for years have been creating a pastoralized bureaucratic class. There has been no real attempt to train New Hebrideans to aspire to any occupation other than that of civil service functionary or church minister. Which, I suppose, is understandable. Civil servants, believing themselves to be the highest form of humanity, naturally assume that all worthy persons would want to be like them and have turned out intellectual clones of themselves in every country. It's no different in the New Hebrides, in fact, it's worse, for there they have been unimpeded in their efforts.

There are no facilities for higher education in the Islands, so those wishing to pursue their education beyond high school must go abroad—an opportunity permitted only a few students. Lini is one of the first New Hebrideans to obtain an advanced degree. Unfortunately, instead of studying medicine, geology, soil science, or any one of the thousands of occupations necessary to develop the Islands, men and women tend to gravitate towards the social sciences which will secure them an administrative position in the government.

### NEOCOLONIALISM IN THE NEW HEBRIDES


As important as the Civil Service is, the Protestant churches are even more instrumental in inculcating collectivist precepts. They've been at it longer. Regarding Melanesians as "heathens" of the worst sort, missionaries throughout the Pacific, have been attempting to destroy that culture for one hundred and fifty years. In the New Hebrides they assumed responsibility for directing the affairs of the people long before the British and French "took over" formally. They worked to create attitudes of dependency on the part of the New Hebrideans, while they assumed a paternalistic stance. To "protect" them from the alleged dangers of commerce and "materialism," cooperative business ventures were supported, while individual proprietorships were discouraged. Foreign investment was regarded as the worst thing that could happen to the Islands.

Actually, only certain kinds of foreign investment were opposed. Non-native corporations, in which mission interest was more than casual, were established, and these controlled the economy, preventing the development of any strong indigenous industries. One of the earliest opponents of Stevens, in his effort to export directly to the market abroad, was the Australian shipping firm of Burns-Philp, which monopolized the export of cocoa, copra (dried coconut kernel), and other produce. Until recently it was one of the largest land

holders in the Islands—second only to SFNH. Not generally known or fully appreciated is the fact that Burns-Philp is largely the creation of the Presbyterian Church, and was aided by hefty subsidies from that organization and from the Australian Government. The churches, especially the Presbyterian, had economic, as well as ideological reasons to oppose someone like Stevens, whose success would threaten their control of the Islands.

Walter Lini claims to have great pride in his New Hebridean heritage, but his actions and plans reveal the contrary. Given his background this could hardly be otherwise. Melanesian society is made up of small, equal, separate political blocs, bound together by loose networks of kinship and trade. It is described as "atomistic" or "fragmented" by those anthropologists who contrast it unfavorably with the more "advanced" Polynesian culture to the East. This is because the Polynesians had a concept of "the state" which resembled the European. Polynesian leaders inherit their social positions—so much more sensible than having to earn it. And they have real power, not just the power of persuasion, but honest to goodness political power—the kind that enabled them to tax the commoners and to wage large scale wars. They even had coteries of dignitaries and other hangers-on, which was not unlike a civil service. Whether consciously or unconsciously, Lini has accepted the old colonialist-missionary line that his culture, and its traditional institutions are inferior.

In accordance with trends of the late 1960's, Lini looked towards Africa for a model for the New Hebrides. At that time Tanzania was being held up for this purpose to various emerging nations in Oceania, such as New Guinea. This, despite the fact that the Tanzanian regime is regarded by Amnesty International as one of the most repressive in all Africa.



Emblem of the Nagriamel movement, which symbolizes racial harmony and native culture.

### FRIENDS OF NAGRIAMEL

While Lini was learning about the glories of socialism either from books, or first hand through visits to Tanzania and other parts of the world, Stevens was formulating his own ideas about what would be appropriate for the future of the New Hebrides. In 1971, while on Fiji, he met Mike Oliver. Although the two men come from different ends of the earth, and are of different race and culture, Stevens has far more in common with him than he will ever have with Lini and his "commisars." Oliver, a self-made business man, is a land developer in Carson City, Nevada. As a child during World War II, he saw first the Russians, then the Germans, pillage and enslave his native Lithuania. The son of poor Jewish parents, he was sent to a ghetto, then to a concentration camp in Germany, surviving miraculously while those around him died or were killed. Both his parents and his two brothers were killed by the Nazis. When the camp was liberated by American troops, he decided to come to the United States rather than return to Lithuania which

had fallen again under Soviet control. With the help of an American Air Force officer he managed to escape "Operation Keelhaul," the infamous forced repatriation of East Europeans by the Allied forces. Due to his own efforts, he is a millionaire today. At some time around 1978, Oliver put together "A Message to the People of the New Hebrides," presenting a brief biographic sketch, his general philosophy, and an account of his dealings with Stevens. In that "Message," he writes, "I do not need anything from the New Hebrides... I have everything I need and then some. Moreover, I am proud of every cent I ever made, because it was done in open competition without fraud or theft from anyone..."

Oliver describes his first meeting with Stevens. "... as a leader of some of the New Hebridean people, he [Stevens] had to make a choice between totalitarianism and individual rights for all. If he chose totalitarianism he could become a dictator with lots of power, but his people would be enslaved, and their well-being would become worse instead of better. If he chose individual rights for all, he would often be abused by his own people, he would not have absolute power, but his people would be free and their living conditions would be improved. I strongly advocated that Mr. Stevens should choose freedom... Mr. Stevens agreed."

The media has, to a degree, over-emphasized the part played by Mike Oliver in Island politics. The two men did not even meet until 1971. Nagriamel was already a movement to be reckoned with, and Stevens' petition had been sent to the UN. Besides, shortly after their meeting, Oliver was dissuaded by certain British interests in Port Vila from helping Stevens, so they had no further contact until the Phoenix Foundation was established (June, 1975).

Ah, yes—the "mysterious" Phoenix Foundation. This was an organization set up for the purpose of collecting funds

elsewhere. The press castigates this kind of private support, but overlooks the millions of dollars which have been poured into the Vanuaku cause, compared with which Oliver's contributions have been slight.

Informal philosophical advice, by Oliver and other libertarians, has been as important as the financial aid. This provided the theoretical basis which Nagriamel lacked, transforming an already vital native movement into one which could have been a model for the Third World. Stevens envisions the New Hebrides as a confederation of four nations, Vemarana being one. Vemarana is the area comprised of Espiritu Santo and fifteen neighboring islands in the northern part of the Group. These four countries would be bound together politically for defense and foreign relations. Now if there's one thing that is anathema to missionaries and civil servants it is "confederation." But an astute Stevens writes in a communique, "We want local control of the affairs by their own people. This can only be done if we have a confederation of the islands. The New Hebrides islands contain many different small nations. The colonial governments made it like one colony and now we try to make one nation of it. But if we step over the traditions of all the people without any consideration for what they want, we will have tyranny and oppression."

Both Lini and Stevens claim to want prosperity to come to the Islands, but this can only be accomplished through an infusion of outside capital. Lini is going the usual route—requesting foreign aid from sympathetic governments—which Stevens regards as begging. Stevens wants to invite private investment and industry to the New Hebrides. There would be no taxes, either on the investors or on the native population. Money for governmental purposes would be raised largely by leasing land to American and European concerns. The leases would be handed out at the discretion of the tribal groups—not the government, and while long term, would not necessarily be permanent. This is intended as an insurance against "take over" or other exploitation. Many libertarians will object that communal ownership of land is not a "pure" libertarian concept. Be that as it may, it is consistent with the original aims and intentions of Nagriamel, and with traditional Melanesian land-holding patterns. And as Stevens puts it, "The local people do not wish to be in a position whereby others get rich in their nation and they are merely shoe shine boys." I can't say as I blame him. This statement, set down in 1978, should indicate that Stevens has never "sold out" to, say, the French, or to outside business interests.

What about the French connection? Again, here's what Stevens has to say—with emphasis added: "Yes, Nagriamel has received support from the French. It has not received the massive help given to the NP by the British... The French apparently see we do not hate them for the colour of their skin... We don't need their government, but French people will always be welcome here. Many of them have already become as much citizens as they are citizens of France. They work the land, and in many cases have married natives, unlike the British who seem merely to be filling colonial positions." (PIM, Feb. 1977). It appears to me that the Dijoud Plan, which the French Government submitted as its plan for post-independence, was based on what Stevens wanted rather than the other way around. Paul Dijoud, Minister of Overseas Territories, pushed for the idea of confederation; and, while believing the land should be owned and held onto by New Hebrideans, held that development would be best done through outside investment. In any case, the views of Dijoud and Stevens certainly coincided.

Individual rights in Vemarana would be spelled out and firmly protected. The services of an attorney, Thomas Eck, to assist in the drafting of a Constitution, modelled after that of the United States, was another of Mike Oliver's contributions. It was put together with considerable input from the Vemaranan leadership. In a society where individual rights are protected, a number of life styles may co-exist and flourish. This is especially important in the New Hebrides where social and economic changes over the next few years will be rapid and sweeping, no matter who's in

others are perfectly aware that it is more important for Clark or SLS to hammer away at the draft or inflation or high taxes rather than denationalization of lighthouses. Our objection is not the setting of priorities, but selling out our principles to pet constituencies—putting constituencies first, and then tailoring principles to suit them.

Mueller gives the case away when he refers to the "obvious need to earn the interest and sympathy of the 'liberal media.'" How about the need to earn the interest and sympathy of the vast bulk of Americans exploited and oppressed by the State? Or does Mueller really think that these two groups are one and the same?

Throughout his memo, furthermore, Mueller confuses style and content; he says a "radical style" attracts hard-core cadre; he says the Clark campaign had to "touch libertarianism in terms" that would appeal to the liberal media, etc. But most of the choices that Mueller treats as purely technical and stylistic are in reality matters of content and principle. When Clark reiterated that welfare must not be cut until full employment is achieved, this was not simply a stylistic decision. But of course to opportunists everywhere content always dissolves into style, and style, of course, is purely a pragmatic decision. Or, to paraphrase Molotov's famous statement about fascism after the signing of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, Mueller apparently believes that libertarianism is only a matter of taste.

As he cuts his swathe through all the realms of human thought—history, strategy, energy, culture, whatever—our half-literate phony radical and "cultural revolutionary" may waffle and bumble and reverse course but of one thing he is certain: the greatness and the glory and the wonder of his boss, employer, and *padrone*: Edward H. Crane III. Here is Mueller the objective and fearless journalist covering the LP National Committee meeting of January, 1979: "the committee, as far as I can determine, has one creative member: Ed Crane. The proceedings of the Nat-Comm can best be represented as a large puddle of mush in which every once in a great while, the sharp contours of a concrete program rose to the surface. Look closely at the program before it sinks back down—nine times out of ten it will bear the signature of Ed Crane." ("The Movement," LR, February, 1979).

Well. Look closely at the sharp contours of every bit of toadying and sycophancy in the libertarian movement, and the chances are nine out of ten that it will bear the signature, if not of his mentor Roy Childs, then of Milton Mueller.

Jeff Friedman: INTREPID LOGICIAN

If Milton Mueller is the cultural revolutionary of the SLS troika, then his successor Jeff Friedman is the liberal environmentalist gone berserker. While Mueller is the half-baked—or quarter-baked—historian of the anti-nukes, Jeff Friedman is the fearless logician who carries environmentalism to its ultimate lunacy. At discussions at a Cato Seminar in the summer of 1979, Friedman made it quite clear how far he was prepared to go. Attempting to frame his environmentalist axiom for libertarians, he averred that "it is an act of aggression for A to change B's environment without B's consent." When informed that this would mean, for example, that someone who disliked blacks coming into his neighborhood, and thereby altering his environment, would have the right to eject those blacks by force, our ruthless logician replied: "I guess that's true." But some of us might consider the very existence of Jeff Friedman an alteration of our environment for the worse... and what then?

Jeff Friedman is an outstanding case of a person with whom one cannot use a *reductio ad absurdum* argument, for he seems to be ready to embrace any *absurdum*. If one informs Friedman that the rocks of Grand Central Station emit more low-level radiation than any nuclear power plant, then Friedman will riposte by calling for the tearing down of that station. Unfortunately for our ruthless logician, however, every thing and every person in the world emits low-level radiation, and hence, in

Friedman's Gofmanite phraseology, gives someone a "random cancer." But in that case, pursuing the logic, we must outlaw and exterminate the entire human race! † One hesitates to put this to Jeff Friedman, for fear of hearing his ruthlessly logical reply.

More so logical of Friedman the libertarian logician and I must pass on. In his defense of the right to abortion he has, once again, gone too far, claiming that every parent has the right to murder his or her baby because that baby is dependent on the parent. When a libertarian colleague remonstrated that we are all dependent on many people, for example he is dependent on his doctor, so does the doctor then have the right to murder him? To which our intrepid logician replied: "yes he does!"

Friedman's thinking is so scrambled that you might suspect he was consciously out to give logic a bad name. But, no, it is certainly not logic which is at fault here—it is Friedman. Surely no one in libertarian circles should ever forget the maxim "Check your premises." I hereby call on the Randians in our movement to do their duty by helping Friedman out with a reminder whenever they can. He needs it.

Turning to Friedman's written oeuvre, we find his notorious Clark anti-nuclear pamphlet, written in violation of a Publication Review Committee mandate. In the pamphlet, anti-nuke propagandist Gofman endorses Clark while Clark adopts the Gofmanite line. To his dubious logical talents, Friedman now adds scientific expertise, stating flatly that all radiation is unsafe, and that we must "forbid aggression against innocent bystanders through the release of harmful radiation." The fact that the overwhelming majority of nuclear physicists and medical physicists believe that low-level radiation is not harmful doesn't seem to faze our young pseudo-scientist in the slightest. Then, in the critique of the LP pollution platform signed by Friedman and Palmer, the authors (presumably mainly Friedman) accuse the LP Platform Committee of sanctioning aggression and even "genocide" (another demagogic term acquired from Gofman) by merely taking the solid libertarian position that no one may be presumed to have committed aggression unless that aggression is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

(This follows Benjamin Tucker's criterion that when one is not sure whether A is aggressing against B or not, the rule should be "laissez-faire"—allow everyone to do what he wants to be doing.)

Jeff Friedman—crazed logician and pretend-scientist—is also something else: a strategist of opportunism. In a revealing memo which he wrote to guide the Clark campaign ("Discussion of Clark Campaign Anti-Nuclear Outreach," Sept. 29, 1979), our budding strategist opined that the "only major cloud on the horizon" to impede Clark getting "millions of votes" (Hah!) was... the Citizens' Party. Unless we make a "major effort to cut into CP support," Friedman declared, "a CP massacre [of the LP in terms of votes] is a distinct possibility." This is particularly true of California, a CP stronghold.\* The thing to do, then, opened our pundit, is to coopt the Citizens' Party support "rather than try to build our own constituency." There's the nub. Indeed: why try to build our own constituency (i.e. of libertarians) when it would be so much easier and faster to steal someone else's alleged constituency—by becoming like the other party? Here is opportunism rampant and repellent!††

Friedman the rampant opportunist continues. As he slyly points out, "One resource the anti-nuclear movement has plenty of, and which we lack, is a large corps of committed, energetic young volunteers. The anti-nuclear cause inspires these people unlike any

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10r, as a lawyer friend told me: "Please, not 'exterminate.' 'Enjoin!' " Would Friedman then really "enjoin" the entire human race?

\*In fact, Commoner got only 60,000 votes in California, less than one-half of even Clark's feeble effort.

††Friedman's sagacity as a political analyst may be gauged by the statement in his memo that, taking an anti-nuke position, the LP would get 750,000 votes in California alone. In fact, upon following Friedman's strategic vision, Clark got less than 150,000 votes in his home state.

Some Board members, however, protested that these moves ran counter to the SLS convention's requirement of a national director chosen by the general membership and the Board's previous understanding that there would be a vote of SLS's entire membership on Mueller's replacement in case he resigned. In addition, Board member Bill Evers protested that he did not approve of a mail ballot on this subject unless a conference call of the Board was held to discuss the proposed changes. Friedman refused to authorize such a call, saying that it was too expensive and that only Evers thought it important.

The second crisis arose out of Friedman's desire to be both a voting member of the Student Board and a full-time paid staffer running SLS's new Washington office. Holding both posts, however, violates the nomination rules governing SLS's 1980 convention (at which Friedman was elected) and a vote of the 1980 convention on the future internal structure of SLS. Later, Steve Reed of Northwestern University SLS confirmed to *Libertarian Vanguard* that the rules which he proposed and which were adopted at the August 1980 SLS convention would count Friedman as an employee and bar him from the Board. These explicitly prohibit SLS employees from sitting on the Student Board. In Detroit, Board members Evers, Scott Olmsted, and Mark Brady, plus voting alternate Ross Levatier all maintained that Friedman was off the Board. Only Board member Linda Wahrman supported him. The gathering in Detroit was unable to effectively conduct business in part because of the controversy over Friedman's status. Friedman himself twice proposed to call in police to remove any Board member who did not acknowledge his authority. Later, in order to cover up his own high-handedness and the chaos it caused, Friedman refused to run the minutes of the meeting prepared by Board secretary Olmsted in SLS's newspaper *Liberty*.

The third crisis arose out of the failure of a constitutional committee headed by Palmer to draft a new constitution by a September 1980 deadline. Board members Olmsted and Evers then drafted a constitution in December, and it was

# SLS Student Board In Disarray

by Bill Evers and Scott Olmsted

The members of the national Student Board of SLS fought and wrangled in Detroit on February 13 as the piling on of three simultaneous crises left the group deeply divided and in disarray. The first crisis was a December palace coup which Tom Palmer engineered in the midst of an SLS financial emergency. He was able to remove newly-elected national director Milton Mueller and replace him with Students for Clark coordinator Jeff Friedman. The second crisis was over the status of Jeff Friedman himself. He was elected to the governing Student Board last August under rules that barred SLS employees from sitting on the Board. The Board then elected Friedman as its chair. Friedman became a full-time SLS employee in December, but refused then to give up his Board seat until March. The third crisis is over a new Constitution which a majority of the Student Board approved in a December mail ballot—a Constitution which first Mueller and now Friedman have refused to implement.

The origins of the palace coup lay in financial angel Charles Koch's statement that he planned to discontinue funding of SLS. Palmer offered to reform SLS to Koch's liking by ousting Mueller, moving the SLS office out of San Francisco, and boosting chapter strength and membership growth. According to Palmer, Koch considered San Francisco a "snakepit," in which Mueller and his associates spent all their time arguing with Radical Caucus members. Confronted with Koch's plans, the Student Board voted by mail to go along with the move to Washington and with the replacement of Mueller by Friedman.

Some Board members, however, protested that these moves ran counter to the SLS convention's requirement of a national director chosen by the general membership and the Board's previous understanding that there would be a vote of SLS's entire membership on Mueller's replacement in case he resigned. In addition, Board member Bill Evers protested that he did not approve of a mail ballot on this subject unless a conference call of the Board was held to discuss the proposed changes. Friedman refused to authorize such a call, saying that it was too expensive and that only Evers thought it important.

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ratified by a majority of the Board (six in favor, none opposed, three abstentions). Mueller then announced that he would ignore the new constitution, which contained provisions on publications oversight that displeased him. In Detroit, Board member Wahrman stated that she had in her own mind thought that the original constitutional committee had participated in the writing of the Olmsted-Evers Constitution. Since it had not, she wanted to rescind her vote. Olmsted and Evers both contended, however, that after the polling was completed, a vote could be regretted, but not rescinded.

Friedman brought to the Detroit gathering a modification of the Olmsted-Evers Constitution that he wanted the Board to approve. Friedman claimed that his suggestions were legitimate and official because of a new theory of apostolic succession that Friedman and Mueller seem to believe overrides parliamentary procedure. According to Mueller, "because his work on the Clark campaign consumed all his time, Palmer removed himself from the (constitutional) committee and selected Milton Mueller as a substitute." Subsequently, Mueller turned over to Friedman the actual drafting of an alternative to the Olmsted-Evers constitution. Olmsted said then and later that he was astounded by this approach to filling vacancies. He asked "by what authority" did Palmer rather than the Student Board name Mueller to the constitutional committee. Olmsted asked whether this did not mean that if he resigned from the Student Board, he could select his own replacement.

Faced with Friedman's proposals in Detroit, the defenders of the Olmsted-Evers Constitution said that it was already in force. Friedman decried such an approach as "bureaucratic." Friedman then asked the gathering to discuss his own constitutional suggestions, which the group agreed to do (with Levatier, Wahrman, and Brady in favor, and Olmsted and Evers against). "I made it very clear," Brady later told *Libertarian Vanguard*, that in discussing Friedman's proposals the group was only acting as "an ad hoc constitutional committee" and not as the Student Board. Yet Mueller now contends that this Detroit vote put Friedman's suggestions into effect and made them new governing rules binding on SLS as a whole (even though Friedman's own plans for internal discussion and modification of wording have not been implemented and even though Friedman's own rules for ratification have not been followed). Brady calls Mueller's contention "absolute rubbish," and Wahrman adds to the confusion by maintaining that no constitution is rightfully in effect.

Since the Detroit meeting, Olmsted has been in frequent contact with other Board members in an effort to resolve the dispute, and since mid-March Friedman has also been discussing possible solutions. As of this writing, the negotiations are still in progress.

During the course of the Detroit gathering a heated dispute took place between Evers and Palmer over the Clark campaign. During the dispute, Palmer said that Clark campaign critic and LP founder David Nolan had "no business calling himself a Libertarian" and said that Nolan deserved "no place in the libertarian movement." Palmer also acknowledged that the tape recording of Ed Clark's interview for *Penthouse* shows that Clark actually did say that "the draft" ought to be "phased out" rather than abolished. But Palmer said that Clark had made a mistake and had meant to say that the military should be phased out.

Bill Evers, former editor of *Inquiry* magazine, and Scott Olmsted—who teaches a course on libertarianism at Stanford when he isn't editing *The Stanford Libertarian*—are both members of the SLS Student Board.





## Left Opportunism: The Case of SLS Part II by Murray N. Rothbard

This is the second of a two-part article. The first installment appeared in the February/March Libertarian Vanguard.

Mueller's stand on the Cold War combines his dubious talent as historian with his ideological opportunism. In his Draft Statement for the SLS Convention, Mueller repeatedly writes off Third World revolutionary struggles as having come to an end ("running its course" and "drawing to a close"). Conveniently ignoring the intensified struggles in Africa and Latin America, this myopia permits Mueller to concentrate on Soviet Russia. Worse yet, it permits him to take up the cynically easy "Third Camp" posture, in which the United States and the Soviet Union are condemned as equally imperialistic. But Mueller though must face the problem of squaring the widely accepted revisionist analysis of the origins of the Cold War—that it was launched almost exclusively by the United States—with his opportunist need to get out from under such an unpopular and seemingly unpatriotic position by taking a convenient plague-on-both-your-houses approach. He can only perform this feat by adopting the hysterical and absurd ultra-hawk view that Russia has been far more imperialistic than the U.S. in the last decade.

### MUELLER TURNS RIGHT

How does Mueller perform this legerdemain: First, he says that the "U.S. empire lays (sic—a typical illiteracy; it should be "lies") static." "Static?" Can one call running virtually the entire world remaining "static"? In a silly sense, perhaps. But if the U.S. expanded swiftly to run and dominate virtually the entire world outside the Soviet bloc in the 1940s and 50s, it is tricky and disingenuous to designate its continued hegemony over most of the world as being "static." But Russia, in the same decade, has had the gall to launch a "furious arms buildup" in order to achieve parity with the United States. (Parity in numbers, perhaps, but not in precision.) Then comes this sentence: the Soviets' "military has grasped for the ability to project power beyond its borders." What in the world is this cloudy sentence supposed to mean: Does it refer to Russia's missiles? How about our own? Does it refer to its conventional army and numbers of

troops? But how about the equally massive Chinese arms buildup which Russia believes threatens its Asian domain?

Mueller's final clincher for his Third Camp position holds that the "most staggering demonstration of the Soviets' newly aggressive posture was the invasion of Afghanistan." In point of fact, Afghanistan is Mueller's only piece of evidence for the alleged "new" aggressiveness of Russia, since we can hardly heap condemnation on Russia for seeking parity with a threatening and aggressive United States. But here Mueller neatly overlooks the crucial fact about Afghanistan: that that country had been in Russia's political military sphere of influence since the early 1920s; that Afghanistan had experienced a native Communist takeover in 1978 to the tune of no protests whatsoever from anyone, right, left, center, or Muellerite in the United States; and that Russia only sent troops into Afghanistan as a last desperate measure to depose a Premier so radically Communist that he was driving the peasant masses into a successful anti-Soviet rebellion.

The point here is not to defend the Soviet incursion into Afghanistan as in any sense libertarian. But it was scarcely "newly aggressive." On the contrary, it simply continued the long-time Soviet foreign policy of strictly defending its post-World War II sphere of influence, rather than going beyond that sphere to extend its empire to new domains. Mueller's evasiveness and duplicity is particularly revealed by his statement: (in re Afghanistan) "It was the first time the USSR had sent its own troops into a Third World country to put down, not to assist, an insurgent movement." This neatly disposes of Hungary and Czechoslovakia, since these benighted countries are presumably "second" instead of "third" world. But the point is that Soviet actions in all these cases were precisely the same, regardless which "world" we assign the country to. In all these countries, Russia was defending the regime of a country in the Soviet ambit from radical internal change. (We must also point out, to underline the ignorance of Mueller as historian, that Russia has never, ever sent in troops to assist an insurgent movement, even though Mueller's statement makes it appear that Russia does this all the time.)

### LEFT-OPPORTUNISM + RIGHT OPPORTUNISM = TOTAL OPPORTUNISM

I don't wish to reargue the nuclear power controversy that absorbed so much of the movement's energy during 1979. Suffice it to say that Milton Mueller's particular variant of anti-nuclear accommodation to the campus liberal counter-culture has stressed, appropriately, the historical argument. This is the rather bizarre view that since nuclear power originated in wartime and was developed by government, it is irredeemably tainted and must be shut down. But radar, too, was developed by government for wartime use; does this mean that radar must be shut down and never used again, even by private firms? Or that government roads must be shut down forever? In all these cases, the libertarian objective is not the lunatic one of destroying every thing or process originating in government, but rather to denationalize—to "privatize"—all such objects and processes. Mueller, too, refuses to recognize that an industry once dependent on government could now stand on its own feet; he thinks of government intervention in nuclear power today as being only one of subsidization, ignoring the vital point that all government regulation imposes costs and delays development. The only way to find out if private nuclear energy is economically viable now is to set it free without government control or subsidy and so find out.

When asked why we should not abandon the at best inaccurate and confusing slogan "stop the nuclear industry" and substitute "stop government intervention in the nuclear industry," Mueller revealingly replied that his own slogan had more "political potency." No doubt, if one confines the potency test to Mueller's supposed constituency of middle-class liberal campus youth.

The Crane Machine's drastic and rapid shift from principled radicalism to opportunism in the spring of 1979 is dramatically revealed in the ideological changes undergone by Milton Mueller. This is true not only of his views on nuclear power (for the earlier, principled Mueller, see "Nuclear Power: Beyond 'For' or 'Against,'" *Illinois Libertarian* Jan. 1978), but also in his view of the proper strategy for political campaigns. As late as the fall of 1978, the earlier Mueller denounced what would soon be

a guiding feature of the Clark campaign: the presentation of an alternate government budget. Mueller properly criticized the Illinois LP that year for proposing a similar alternative budget, which, as he pointed out, "puts a libertarian in the Kafkaesque dilemma of pretending that there is a rational and just way to decide how much robbery and coercion people should accept." To ask how much specific government department budgets should be cut, averred Mueller, "are silly questions for a libertarian to even attempt to answer"; to try to do so "is to understand the moral contradictions embodied by such a format." ("The Movement," *Libertarian Review*, Oct. 1978).

But that was before the Great Crane Turn of the spring of '79, a turn which perforce brought all his minions and satraps along with him. In the secret final section of his SLS memo, "The Case for a Post-Election Student Organizing Effort," gone is the Mueller once critical of "Kafkaesque" electoral strategy. Instead, in his mid-campaign panegyric for the Clark campaign, he hails its "self-evident" success, as well as the "incredible success" of *Libertarian Review*. The betrayal of principle of these Cranian institutions is for Mueller transmuted into "creative" strategy, while those libertarians who denounced such a sellout are greeted with the Brandenian psychosmear: "fear of success."

What, specifically, is all this "success" we are supposed to be "afraid of"? The highly trumpeted "success" of Clark, LR, and SLS is vague at best, and is largely hype—but at most it is simply numbers: votes, attention, subscriptions, members. But votes for what? Numbers of what? For low-tax liberalism or for "stop nukes"? That kind of success has been achieved all too frequently by other, better-financed, shrewder organizations in the past; left-liberalism does not need libertarians tailing behind them to bring them more "success." No, none of us would be afraid of true success, of genuine victory. What we hate and revile (not "fear") is the betrayal and corruption of the name and the concepts of liberty that we have fought for all our lives by supposed colleagues whooring after big numbers. That is not "success," but grisly failure.\*

Mueller grows more specific by making clear that what he means by "success" is simply making strategic choices as political or ideological activists. He defends the Clark campaign, and by implication his own actions, by asserting that Dave Nolan, myself and other severe critics of Clark/Crane opportunism failed to realize that activists, in contrast to theorists, must



Milton Mueller

set priorities as to which issues to focus on. Now this criticism is simple hogwash. Obviously, Nolan, myself and

\*Unsurprisingly, Mueller gushes about LR because of its alleged success of having "integrated libertarianism into contemporary culture" and applied "libertarianism to cultural issues." But since there is no such thing as libertarian culture, what this translates into is Mueller's adulation of LR for doing what he has done at SLS: betrayed and traduced libertarian principle by melting it into the "hippie" counter-culture of middle-class liberalism, thereby alienating everyone else.

charge. Accelerated change is often painful to those caught in it, however, in Vemarana, no one would be forced to take any "great leap forward." Individuals and groups could continue to live according to their customs, saying in effect, "Count Us Out." But under Lini's regime, a person is expected "to work according to his talents in socially useful employment" and "to recognize that he can fully develop his abilities and advance his true interests only by active participation in the development of the national community." Those are just two of the "Fundamental Duties" laid down by Lini in his Constitution. Lini's Constitution also provides for the creation and perpetuation of an entrenched civil service, the permanency of whose jobs is the only thing to which protection is guaranteed.

But besides the list of mandated "Duties," there are two issues of paramount importance which point up the

differences between the constitutions and their governments: freedom of the press and freedom of (or from) religion. Lini would, as a "right" permit "freedom of expression," unless an "expression" threatened the "legitimate public interest in defence, safety, public order, welfare and health." Eck's constitution provides for full liberty of speech and press: "No law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press, or any other communications method." That's a big difference! Remember the tape recorded messages Stevens used in the early days of Nagriamel, and the radio transmitter given by Oliver!

What about religious freedom? Both constitutions declare it to be a right, but Lini stresses, in his Preamble, that the "Republic of the New Hebrides (is) founded on traditional Melanesian values, faith in God, and Christian principles." After all, Lini and most of his

cabinet, are ordained ministers. Stevens has a different perspective: "Nagriamel stands by custom. Custom is custom, and religion is religion—they should not be mixed up... some white missionaries wrote some very harsh letters to me. They said I was the son of the devil. These pastors said that if the people followed me that I'd lead them to hell..." (*New Hebrides Road*, . . .). He seems absolutely right when he adds: "These missionaries hope to use the National Party as a tool in building these islands into a kind of theocracy, or religious dictatorship, which would have little respect for the tribal customs of the native peoples." And a year or so ago, women on some of the Southern Islands who were active in the nationalist movement, began wearing the "Mother Hubbard"—the old Presbyterians cover-up. Shades of the Ayatollah! The future's not too bright. Little news of the Islands reaches the US,

and what little we have reveals there is tremendous unrest, and that the economy is collapsing. How much force Lini will be prepared to use to shore up his wobbly regime is anyone's guess. Will he call once again on his Australian and PNG friends for help? And if he does, will they respond? We do know that Stevens is alive, and a recent note in *PIM* indicates that he may be released from the prison on Espiritu Santo, and exiled to Pentecost Island. Let's hope he will be allowed to leave Pentecost. Fourteen years is a harsh punishment, especially for one who has dreamed of freedom and worked so long for it, not only for himself, but for the people of Nagriamel. □

Sarah E. Foster is a Los Angeles Libertarian activist and writer. Her work has appeared in Reason, Caliber, and other libertarian periodicals.

## Reagan's "New Beginning": Pentagon Socialism

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going the way of Chrysler, with or without regulatory "reform." The administration's reluctance to even deal with the issue is a strategy that cannot last long. The drama of the free trade question within the Reagan administration may reach an exciting climax in May, when the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki is likely to be marred by racist anti-Japanese demonstrations initiated by the auto unions. Before the situation comes to that, the Reaganites are hoping that they can persuade the Japanese government to regulate the market from their side by "voluntarily" limiting auto exports. Reagan's Cabinet-level auto task force has stated that Japan must unilaterally decide to

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### THE FREE TRADE QUESTION

A specter is haunting the ostensibly "free market" class-collaborators within the Reagan administration—the specter of the U.S. auto industry. War is often preceded by the blight of protectionism. And—in spite of the Reagan administration's formal adherence to the principles of international free trade—it looks like the blight is upon us.

Auto sales by the Big Three are down 16.4%. General Motors seems to be

going the way of Chrysler, with or without regulatory "reform." The administration's reluctance to even deal with the issue is a strategy that cannot last long. The drama of the free trade question within the Reagan administration may reach an exciting climax in May, when the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki is likely to be marred by racist anti-Japanese demonstrations initiated by the auto unions. Before the situation comes to that, the Reaganites are hoping that they can persuade the Japanese government to regulate the market from their side by "voluntarily" limiting auto exports. Reagan's Cabinet-level auto task force has stated that Japan must unilaterally decide to



Reagan and his court discuss economic policy.

restrict auto exports. Japan's trade minister, meanwhile, is waiting for the U.S. to make a specific request before action is taken. Both General Motors and the United Auto Workers are demanding import curbs. Senator John C. Danforth (R-Mo.) and Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D-Texas) have introduced a bill in Congress calling for mandatory import restrictions for the next three years to reduce Japanese imports to 1.6 million units per year. Last year Japan exported 1.82 million cars to the U.S.; one out of five cars sold in this country was a Japanese import.

Reagan's record on this issue is far from free market oriented. His real allegiance became clear when he endorsed the Chrysler bailout. While paying lip service to "free trade"—rhetoric to soothe divisions within his own administration—the specter of protectionism still haunts the Reagan administration. The issue is still unresolved—it seems there is a split on this question within the administration—and it remains to be seen which way the Reaganites will go. The "supply-side" solution—that we export the problem of regulation to the Japanese—is a perfect example of their profoundly anti-free market adaptation to imperialism. In this case, the "free market" is a privilege extended only to the core of America's imperial domain—the U.S. itself. This one-sided "supply-side" distortion of free trade principles is what happens to the "free market" when authoritarian neoconservatives pervert ideas in the service of militarism. In the end, the supply-siders will probably have their way. The problem, as the *New York Times* commented, is "to find a way of telegraphing to the Japanese what it is the United States would like them to do." That is, how can the Reagan administration placate the auto industry and still remain for-

mally committed to free trade? Undoubtedly, supply-side pragmatists like Jude Wanninksi will seek a way to "accommodate" all concerned—all but the poor consumer who will be stuck with higher prices, increased inflation, less choice, and less quality.

### STOCKMAN'S BUDGET

The Stockman budget characterizes the Reagan administration politically, and is ample verification of our initial analysis of Reaganism as essentially a form of rightwing "Pentagon socialism," a loose coalition glued together by Cold

War ideology. [See "America Goes Bonzo"; *Libertarian Vanguard* Nov./Dec. 1980; p. 4] In spite of all the mumbo-jumbo about a "cost-benefit analysis," the only real question is: who pays the costs and who gets the benefits? For our cost-benefit analysis in the Reagan administration, all costs are political costs and all benefits are political benefits. Whatever will keep Reaganism—even without Reagan—in power is, by this standard, worth the cost: regardless of who has to pay it. In Reagan's America, Lockheed, and Raytheon, Tenneco and General Dynamics, McDonnell Douglas and United Technologies—these, and the bankers who finance the whole thing, are the chief beneficiaries of the neo-conservative program.

We can see the real class forces at work—we can see the new battle lines forming between the people on one side and the State on the other—by examining sectors other than the Pentagon which escaped Stockman's notice.

• *Foreign aid*—Haig was triumphant in his first skirmish with Stockman, avoiding proposed foreign aid cuts and maintaining a higher level of direct economic aid than Jimmy Carter in the last year of the Democratic administration. The World Bank, aid to Israel, Egypt and Morocco were all supposedly going to get the budget axe. But Haig prevailed, and most of the foreign aid programs went virtually unscathed.

• *Veterans Administration*—Stockman didn't even bother with this one, which no Washington politician will touch with a ten-foot pole. The ultra-conservative veterans lobby is one of the most powerful in the nation; they can reportedly produce a letter from every one of 15,000 veterans posts around the country on the desk of every legislator in Congress. When Carter vetoed legisla-

tion that would have raised the salaries of dentists and doctors working at veterans' hospitals his veto was overridden in the Senate 85 to 0 and in the House, 401 to 5! Of course, that the neo-conservatives have no intention of abolishing even a small fraction of the bureaucracy is perfectly obvious even to the casual observer, but this particular omission stands out because of an article which appeared in *Policy Review*, a prominent neo-conservative journal, entitled "The Social Pork Barrel." "Many members of Congress openly admit to holding their noses when the annual \$12 billion is appropriated for the Veterans Administrations, most of which benefits servicemen who do not have even a hangnail to show for their harrowing experiences in uniform." The author of that article is David Stockman.

• *Communications*—While National Public Radio feels the full brunt of Stockman's budgetary wrath (we wonder why he didn't just abolish the damn thing), Radio Free Europe and other U.S. propaganda outlets get more money than ever.

• *Environmentalist regulations*—Although some regulations will be relaxed (formally the law, in most cases not enforced) environmentalist pressure groups have lobbied successfully to keep the Council on Environmental Quality, as a sop to Sierra Club types and others upset by the appointment of corporate statists to the Department of the Interior.

• *Land*—This is where the authoritarian political tradition of Reagan and the neo-conservatives really comes to the fore. Instead of returning land stolen by the government to its original owners (or their heirs), instead of allowing homesteading, the Reagan administration intends to hand over large parcels of land to favored developers. This is the biggest pork barrel of them all, a racist slap in the face for all Mexican-American and Native American people who will have the land stolen from them for the second time in U.S. history. This wholesale land theft is the final proof that Reaganism and property rights are irreconcilable opposites, on the most fundamental level. The government has no right to sell or lease land which does not belong to it in the first place. From this Libertarian principle it follows that either A) the rightful owner must be found, or B) unclaimed land may be homesteaded. This is the only program consistent with property rights and justice, which is the moral basis of libertarian ideology.

• *Tobacco subsidies*—The political significance of this particular omission is obvious—it is due entirely to the influence of ultra-rightwing Senator Jesse Helms, Republican from North Carolina. Nancy Reagan, unsurprisingly, has her own pet boondoggle: the "foster grandparents" program, which is not even so much as mentioned in the budget cuts.

To add insult to injury, one White House official has revealed administration plans to raise penalties on late Internal Revenue Service payments. And to see the Reaganites in the role of regulators is certainly revealing, as the following excerpt from a *New York Times* interview with new OSHA chief Thorne G. Auchter makes clear:

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# Reagan's "New Beginning": Pentagon Socialism

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**Q** In fact, many employers complain that the costs of meeting OSHA regulations are not worth the benefits returned in worker health and safety. Others criticize the agency for unduly interfering with their way of doing business.

**A** [Auchter] It depends on how you define "undue interference." I've had lots of conversations with lots of people—labor and management, political and scientific—and no one has suggested OSHA be gutted. Industry wants the same thing as everybody concerned—that this agency be an effective tool for workers: safety and health as Congress intended. ("Toward A 'Neutral' Role For OSHA," *New York Times*, 3/29/81.)

Thus we see that the opportunist error of failing to cut back the "public" sector whenever possible inevitably leads to a policy which strengthens the power of the bureaucracy; failure to abolish OSHA leads the Reaganites to defend OSHA's legitimacy and whatever regulations it manages to enforce. The same goes for Stockman's much-touted budget cuts: those cuts which are not made must be defended, and thus the administration is automatically trapped into undercutting its own case for reducing government in size and

scope.

While radical libertarians engage in reform struggles in order to build a libertarian movement, such reforms can never be ends in themselves. In this way concrete short-term gains—reforms—are seen, in perspective, as tactical signposts on the long road toward liberty and the goal of building a radical libertarian party on a mass scale. In contrast to this *movement-building* orientation, the opportunist element within the Libertarian Party, as well as the Reaganites, are concerned only with immediate reforms of a very limited kind. The Presidential campaign of Ed Clark—which actually offered a Libertarian alternative budget during the campaign—made an identical error, and was likewise actually forced to defend those areas not cut by the proposed budget to radical Libertarian rank-&-file party members. Unsurprisingly, the opportunist wing of the Libertarian Party associated with the Clark campaign is now moving steadily rightward [see "Opportunist Move Rightward (Part II)" elsewhere in this issue] acting more and more like ostensibly "libertarian" advisors to the Reagan administration.

Counterposed to the opportunist non-strategy of tailing after the right-wing revival, we in the LPRC juxtapose a strategy of confronting, outflanking and ultimately *splitting* the Reaganite "consensus."

We must confront Reaganism politically by opposing Reagan's "supply-side" panacea and upholding a free market backed by a gold standard. The movement for a gold standard was once a mass movement in this country, and it can be so again.

We must outflank the Reaganites by demanding an end to "Pentagon socialism." We can win over the best of the Reaganites by calling for an end to the Pentagon's immunity from the budget cuts. If Reagan and Stockman are going to "go to the public" in order to get around a Democratic House of Representatives, public demonstrations calling for massive cuts in "defense" spending in addition to deeper cuts in spending for so-called "social" programs would make an effective political point.

And, ultimately, we must split the best of the grassroots Reaganites off from the neoconservatives by means of direct political intervention in taxpayer organizations and other possible arenas. If done in an organized, systematic way such a tactic could provide many of the cadres necessary for the construction of an effective Libertarian Party organization.

Whatever the particular features of a Libertarian strategy for the Reagan years, it is clear that the general orientation of such a strategy must consist of a single element: implacable opposition.



Defense Secretary Weinberger (left) and OMB Director David Stockman; Reagan's phony budget "cuts" leave Weinberger's domain bigger and fatter than ever.

## Junta Holocaust

continued from page 5

the coalition's cynical opportunism, and its exclusionary, divisive "principles of unity," we see that such an omission is entirely consistent with their actions to date. Not only did the coalition fail to express formal solidarity with the people of El Salvador but, in actual practice, their short-sighted, sectarian approach will surely postpone an FDR/FMLN victory and prolong the junta's rule.


The movement against intervention in El Salvador is too important to be obstructed by dogmatic leftists intent on sacrificing the fate of an entire people for the sake of their petty political ambitions. We urge independent anti-war activists, draft-age youth, and independent leftists who realize the gravity of the situation in El Salvador to join with us in fighting sectarianism in the anti-war movement, and building a massive response to Reagan's war drive—the only kind of response which can concretely help the people of El Salvador in their hour of need.

In addition, the Central Committee of the Libertarian Party (Radical Caucus) urges all LPRC members and all libertarians to support and join your local Committee In Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES), a coalition of religious groups, anti-war activists, and others concerned with US Policy in that troubled nation. CISPES Membership is only \$5. You get their newsletter, *El Salvador Alert*, and are notified of all activities. CISPES may be contacted at their national office. Write: CISPES, Box 12056, Washington D.C. 20005. (Call: 202-887-5020.) In Los Angeles, write: Casa El Salvador "Farabundo Marti," 606 S. Bonnie Brae St., L.A. CA 90057. (Call: 213-484-9591.) In San Francisco, write: Casa El Salvador "Farabundo Marti," 3557 20th St., SF, CA 94110. (Call: 415-282-3070.) In New York City, write: Casa El Salvador "Farabundo Marti," 41 Union Sq., Rm. 318, NY, NY 10013. (Call: 212-675-5025.)

CISPES has over fifty chapters around the country. We urge libertarians to join CISPES chapters where they exist, and organize them where they do not as yet exist. We must stand with the people of El Salvador—before the full force of US imperialism is brought to bear on them. We must mobilize a mass movement against US intervention and aid to rightwing terrorists—before it's too late. We must hear witness—before the slaughter begins.

renewed demands to legalize the farmers' union. The demands of Rural Solidarity were added to the other demands submitted by Walsea and union negotiators to the government at the insistence of militants on the national commission. "Moderates" tended to play down the farmers' demands because they drove a wedge between the reformist Solidarity leadership and Lech Walsea's favorite PUWP bureaucrats. "We have to learn who is against us farmers," declared a farmer at Rural Solidarity's first national congress held in Poznan on March 9, "whether it's Kania, Marshall Gucwa [head of the Communist front "Peasant Party," a placebo organization; Gucwa is Speaker of Parliament] or whoever. Whoever it is, we'll deal with him. We must have democratic elections to Parliament and get rid of Gucwa." When the farmers find out that the enemy is not just one individual, or one clique, but the socialist system itself, they will become a powerful force for revolution. If the political situation keeps developing at a rapid pace, that day is not far.

It is no coincidence that the focus of the Bydgoszcz incident—a sit-in staged by members of Rural Solidarity at the local headquarters of the Peasant Party—was the question of an independent union for farmers and the persecution of private agricultural workers. Of course, the "moderates" in Solidarity are none too eager to tackle what is a hot issue; this is one reason Walsea was so adamantly opposed to calling a general strike over the Bydgoszcz incident. Such a general strike would have mobilized the entire country around the cause of the farmers—and, by implication, the cause of the private sector.



"One section of the Solidarity movement—Rural Solidarity, the union of private farmers—seems to have a relatively clear idea of just what the Polish people are up against. . . In alliance with KOR, and other Solidarity militants, Rural Solidarity could provide the nucleus of a revolutionary movement capable of . . . eventually overthrowing the socialist system."



## ON THE BRINK

**T**he Polish events are not occurring in an international vacuum; they must be considered in the context of superpower contention, and the present balance of world forces. Since the two superpowers view everything in terms of the conflict between the US and the USSR, in the end what the Kremlin does will be to a large extent determined by the progress of the Cold War.

In view of the hysterical and irresponsible actions of US government—Weinberger and Haig were declaring at the height of the crisis that a Soviet invasion was "imminent"—the relatively moderate tone of Brezhnev's speech at the recently held Czechoslovak Communist party congress was surprisingly reasonable. Significantly, most of the speech was concerned with the question of nuclear disarmament. Brezhnev—declaring that Poland was capable of solving its own problems—but reiterating that, if it couldn't, the Soviets would step in to "defend socialism"—is clearly interested in making certain concessions on the question of Poland in return for a reduction in the arms race.

That the Reagan administration's policy of confrontation with the Soviets increases the chances of a Soviet invasion of Poland is beyond question. When Richard Pipes, advisor to Defense Secretary Weinberger, declares that US policy should be to "roll back" the Soviet empire; when his boss tours Europe proclaiming the death of détente; when Haig talks about "drawing the line" in El Salvador; when Reagan comes out for arming Afghan guerrillas—the chances of the brave Polish people grow slimmer. Washington's threats—like Weinberger's threat to arm China in response to an invasion—are nothing but deliberate provocation. If the Soviets are led to believe that the US will carry out these threats in any event, no matter what happens in Poland, the Kremlin will figure that they have nothing to lose by invading. Indeed, a faction within the Central Committee of the Soviet Union—led by chief ideologist Mikhail Suslov—reportedly supported sending in the Red Army by arguing along similar lines.

If and when the Soviets invade Poland, the political and moral responsibility for such a criminal turn of events will have to be shared by both the USSR and the US.

Although the US government propaganda mill—in collusion with the regular news media—will make the war hysteria which accompanied the hostage crisis seem like only a prelude to the real thing, the joint responsibility of both superpowers must be acknowledged and condemned.

The "Brezhnev Doctrine" is only the mirror image of the "Carter Doctrine"; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which is occurring right in the Soviet's own "back yard," is Russia's El Salvador. This world system of client states and contending spheres of influence is jointly maintained by both superpowers; inevitably, nationalist uprisings will occur in this context—and, just as inevitably, each superpower will seek to exploit the situation in order to extend its own power and influence.

But the rising tide of nationalist revolutions against both superpowers is too strong to be confined in the straightjacket of superpower contention: it is, in and of itself, a *third force* in world politics which cannot be stopped or contained by either superpower.

If the Polish people are to be sacrificed on the altar of the Cold War—if hypocritical provocations provide Soviet hardliners with the rationale for an invasion—the cynicism of Reaganite rhetoric about "rolling back" the Iron Curtain will be exposed for the empty posturing (for domestic consumption only) that it truly is. For US provocations will achieve exactly the *opposite* of declared policy goals; instead of paving the way for the de-stabi-

lization of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, the end of détente will indefinitely postpone far-reaching changes in the Soviet system signaled by the Polish events. This, of course, is the number one item at the top of Reagan's actual foreign policy agenda; it is, after all, a bit embarrassing for every volley of belligerent Reaganite rhetoric to be met by a renewed Soviet peace offensive. Our European allies in particular, are less than pleased by Reagan's bombast. The reality of a weak, unwieldy Soviet leadership which is pursuing the goal of nuclear disarmament with single-minded tenacity is a far cry, indeed, from a fanatical Comintern intent on exporting "international terrorism": far from verifying the Reaganite view of the world, the actions of the USSR have so far succeeded in verifying just the opposite. But if the US can provoke the Soviets into giving the Red Army its marching orders, hardliners in the Kremlin will be that much closer to gaining the upper hand. This, perhaps, is the real purpose behind the administration's gleeful projections of an "imminent" Soviet invasion: such a prophecy could easily become self-fulfilling.

Indeed, if the Russians don't invade Poland, the Reaganites are *really* in trouble: for this will mean that the "renewal" of Polish socialism will be permitted to spread to the Soviet Union itself. Thus, whatever economic links still bind the Soviet bloc and the Western alliance into an emerging world statist system will be preserved—and the ideological differences between the two political systems (run by rival wings of the same emerging world elite) will be even more blurred than they already are. The Communists will then be rendered unfit for the role of archetypal villains so essential to Reagan's rearmament program and renewed US determination to shore up the US Empire.

Arrayed against the Polish people is the full arsenal of tricks, threats, obstacles and diversions encouraged not only by both superpowers, but by the Roman Catholic Church and the dominant reformist tendency within the Solidarity movement itself. But, as our own history—as well as the history of the modern world—demonstrates, people fighting for independence and self-determination can and often do fight and win against overwhelming odds.

The prospects for liberty in Poland are indeed dark—but the heroism and endurance of the Polish people has, so far, proved more than equal to the task. "Historical trends can be defied," we wrote in the *Draft Program of the Libertarian Party Radical Caucus*, "and changed by those who are willing to fight for their ideas." If even only a few Poles are willing and able to do battle with the forces arrayed against them, then perhaps a free Poland is not just a distant dream.

Justin Raimondo is the founder of the Libertarian Party Radical Caucus; he is also the editor of *Libertarian Vanguard*.



SOLIDARITY WEEKLY, the union's newspaper, on sale for the first time.

# KNOWLEDGE

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
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"Far from constituting a challenge to the caste system based on socialized property forms, the reforms sought by Walsea and his allies in the Church and the PUWP will strengthen the foundations of that system. Poland's 'renewal' is just the opposite of a revolution... Far from destroying the basis of class rule in Poland, Walsea wants to preserve and 'renew' the vile system which denies the people their liberty and the nation its independence."



Lech Walsea

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Here, Burnham anticipates Walsea's Solidarity, and the widespread observation on the part of many current commentators (including some in the Kremlin!) that the union has indeed become a real political opposition. Burnham also anticipates the establishment of joint government/Solidarity commissions to investigate workers' grievances, the integration and co-optation of "reforms" into the structure of the socialist caste system when he writes:

The governmental bureaus would feel the impact of their influences, and mechanisms could easily arise for mediating conflicts. This is not at all an empty speculation. Something of this kind already takes place in the totalitarian nations. In spite of the surface rigidity, it represents a democratic intrusion, capable of indefinite development, in the totalitarian political systems. Democracy grown along these lines would be able to function, up to a point, without being a dangerous threat to the social rule, the power and privileges, of the managers or to the foundations of the new society.

This potential for "indefinite development" is precisely what PUWP hardliners, as well as relatively moderate PUWP officials like Kania and Jaruzelski, fear the most. And, of course, this is the reason for the ominous Soviet military build-up.

However, the statement by Leonid Brezhnev at the height of the crisis that Poland is capable of solving its own problems indicates that the Kremlin is less than eager to send in the Red Army. Although this possibility cannot be ruled out, the prospect of a Soviet invasion has receded for the moment. Thus, the question of whether this "democratic intrusion" into the socialist bloc is capable of "infinite development"—perhaps even into the USSR itself—is still entirely open. If the Kremlin is dominated by an aging bureaucracy which makes its Polish cousin look innovative, then one possible consequence of the Polish events becomes obvious. Where there are "Lions" there are also "Foxes"—even in that old Lions' den, the Kremlin itself.

Leonid Brezhnev is a very old man; undoubtedly the current factional alignments within the Kremlin are already maneuvering for power. The Polish events have thrown the Russian ruling class into a crisis; how will the heirs of the October Revolution face the fact that socialism has failed, that the working class is rebelling, that the concept of the Leninist party in state power is beginning to crumble at its very foundations? Regardless of whether or not the Red Army is called in this particular instance, the long-term question remains: will the "Lions" in the Kremlin panic and retreat into neo-Stalinism, or will red "Foxes" lead the ruling class to "renewal"?

This is the question posed by the Polish events. And the answer to this question—which means reform or revolution for the

socialist bloc, and perhaps a significant shift in the balance of world forces—may be answered sooner than anyone imagines. The situation in Poland continues to develop with breathtaking speed. As we wrote at the beginning of this article, any attempt to predict even the short-term outcome of events would be a risky business indeed. Burnham himself was very cautious:

On the whole, it seems to me that a later democratic development in managerial society is likely. It would, however, be an error for those who like democracy to be over-optimistic about it. It is not certain on the evidence so far. And it does not seem indicated for the next day, or year, or decade. This much is clear: The democracy of capitalist society is on the way out, is, in fact, just about gone, and will not come back. The democracy of managerial society will be some time being born; and its birth pangs will include drastic convulsions. [The Managerial Revolution; pp. 170-71]

But Burnham was a determinist, who saw the coming of "managerial society"—a form he claimed was neither capitalism nor socialism but rule by the "managers" over the state and the means of production—as inevitable. His predictions concerning democracy, and the remnants of the private sector in the West have proved false; both democracy and the embattled private sector have survived, battered perhaps, but far from "on the way out." Burnham—who eventually became an advocate of a "protracted conflict" with the Soviet Union, and was associated with the right-wing *National Review*—was wrong about capitalism because he never understood the nature and power of the market economy. Like the neo-conservative Cold Warriors he had joined—and like his old comrades in the Fourth International (who kicked him out of the Trotskyist movement for opposing Trotsky's line on the class character of the USSR)—Burnham's worldview does not include the choosing, acting individual. For Burnham, man is helpless before history, buffeted about by forces beyond his control. Liberty, declares Burnham and the *National Review* crowd, must be postponed until Communism is annihilated. (That is, liberty must be postponed indefinitely.) The classless and free society, say the Marxists, must be postponed until the class struggle is over. (That is, the classless and presumably stateless society must be indefinitely postponed.)

This is the endless litany repeated not only by tyrants, but by would-be reformists of every hue and shade. At the meeting of Solidarity's national commission called to ratify Walsea's sell-out accord, a tape recording of a meeting between union leaders and Polish primate Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński was played. "Put demands on the installment plan," said the representative of the Roman Catholic Church, echoing the line of the PUWP, Solidarity "moderates," and the Kremlin itself.

Whatever else divides this unholy alliance, these disparate elements have reached an accord on one important point: The Polish people are going too far, too fast.

But wouldn't the Russians have invaded if a general strike had been called? Well, first of all, there is really no way to know such a thing, and for this reason alone such an objection is invalid. Secondly, if we're going to speculate about what might have happened, an invasion scenario at this particular point in the crisis seems unlikely. The Brezhnevites on the CPSU Central Committee seem to be firmly in control; in addition, Brezhnev obviously intends to give the PUWP a chance to either crush or co-opt Solidarity all by itself. In fact, Walsea's alliance with the "reform" wing of PUWP is far more likely to bring about a Soviet invasion. The Russians are more concerned about a break-away Polish Communist party than they are about a revolution led by Solidarity—after all, the PUWP already has control of the state apparatus.



## THE ROAD TO REVOLUTION

My thesis is that the present level of struggle in Poland is essentially *intra-class warfare*, a battle between the Moscow-aligned bureaucrats (Pareto's "Lions") and the more nationalistic managers (Pareto's "Foxes"). But it should be obvious that the political situation in Poland is *in motion*. It is true that the mass Solidarity movement has been diverted by mis-leaders like Walsea, who have tied their fate to the fortunes of various factions within the ruling class—but this initial setback does not mean that a revolutionary anti-socialist upsurge is out of the question. Revolution is still on the Polish agenda.

The historic split in Polish Communism—which pits nationalist sentiments against "proletarian internationalism"—is but a reflection of Poland's long, tortuous struggle for national self-determination. Obviously, the Solidarity movement is energized by *nationalism*. The PUWP is hated for the same reason Nazi collaborators were hated during World War II; party members are viewed as agents of an occupying army. Solidarity's official colors—red and white—are the colors of the Polish flag.

But every anti-imperialist struggle is fueled by nationalism. It is a natural reaction to superpower imperialism; it is natural that initial protests will take on pre-existing forms and traditional trappings.

But a libertarian class analysis reveals the real nature of the struggle in Poland as a class struggle—which pits the people

against an elite caste based on nationalized property forms and state control over the commanding heights of Polish society. Every attempt to divert the movement for self-determination away from the necessity of breaking the power of the PUWP—whether it be Walsea's reformism, the admonitions of the Church, or warnings from Moscow—will ultimately fail. The crisis of Marxism is acute, the bread lines are getting longer; every attempt to "reform" the system, to provide the most basic necessities, will run into the limitations of the socialist system—and point toward the free market alternative. Even the "moderate" Solidarity strategists, who are mainly concerned with keeping the movement within certain bounds, openly admit this—even while they maneuver to tail after the reform wing of the PUWP. "The democratic plague in the party may mean that the heart of the system of rule may stop beating," says one such strategist [New York Times; 4/12/81] "I think our neighbors will not tolerate this. But we [in Solidarity] have no influence over it, and it is impossible to stop—like trying to stop a car with your bare hands."


One section of the Solidarity movement—Rural Solidarity, the union of private farmers—seems to have a relatively clear idea of just what the Polish people are up against. Alone among the Warsaw Pact nations, most of Poland's agricultural lands are in private hands. Of the nation's 47 million acres of farm land, 80% is private, 18% tilled by collective farms and 2% is farmed by cooperatives. The official name of the movement which has come to be known as "Rural Solidarity" is a good indication of its class character: "Independent Self-Ruling Trade Union for Private Farmers/Solidarity." The peasant movement, with help from KOR, has always resisted the schemes of the central planners; they insist that private lands must remain private, and so far the government has agreed in spite of Moscow's disapproval. Most of the farmer's demands concern the difficulty the beleaguered private sector has functioning within the confines of a socialist economy. Unfortunately, the influence of the Church on the peasantry is a mixed blessing; while the Church does indeed provide a certain amount of protection from what is a de facto army of occupation, Rural Solidarity does not need to be told to put its demands "on the installment plan."

In alliance with KOR, and other Solidarity militants, Rural Solidarity could provide the nucleus for a revolutionary movement capable of challenging—and eventually overthrowing—the socialist system. Already, KOR's theoreticians seem to be moving toward the idea that what they are fighting is not a distortion, or a misunderstanding of Marxism; as higher levels of struggle are achieved, stopping the best militants from understanding that Marxism itself spawned the Polish ruling class will be "like trying to stop a car with your bare hands."

The farmers' demands were a sore point with the PUWP before the government recognized Rural Solidarity—and PUWP negotiators refused to back down when confronted, during the recent crisis, by

"In response to attacks on 'anti-socialist' forces within Solidarity, Walsea said: 'If he (Prime Minister Jaruzelski) points out anti-socialist forces, we shall help remove them. At a time when the Soviet official press agency Tass was attacking KOR activist Jacek Kuron by name Walsea publicly attacked both Kuron and the militant wing of Solidarity.'"

Jacek Kuron



"Like lightning at midnight," we wrote late last year [Is The Red Tide Turning?; Libertarian Vanguard; October 1980] "the Polish explosion illuminates the international landscape: for a single moment, frozen in time, the real contours of the world statist system are visible for all to see."

With the recent police attack on twenty-three Solidarity activists in the town of Bydgoszcz—three of whom were seriously injured, including one 63-year-old militant—the Polish explosion has reached new heights of intensity. What had been a series of warning strikes, brief flashes lighting up the political horizon, now threatens to engulf all Poland in a storm.

The crisis of Polish Communism is developing so rapidly that any attempt to chronicle—or analyse—the drama as it unfolds is a risky business indeed. Although, as we go to press, the threat of a Soviet invasion has diminished, the Red Army could be given its marching orders at a moment's notice. For it was the Red Army, not a popular uprising, which brought socialism to Poland in 1944—and, perhaps, only that same Red Army can prevent the collapse of Polish socialism in 1981.

In any event, although there is no way to predict how the Kremlin will respond to the crisis, certain things can be said about the character and trajectory of the Polish Solidarity movement itself.



## LIONS & FOXES

They call it the *odnowa*, the "renewal," Poland's "Prague Spring." It is the most recent—and most powerful—incarnation of a movement deeply rooted in the history not only of Poland, but of all Eastern

Europe. From Tito to Gomulka to Dubcek to the reform wing of the ruling Polish United Workers' Party (PUWP), the legacy of "socialism with a human face" is an illusion that refuses to dissipate. What is being touted in the West as an anti-Communist revolt is, in fact, nothing of the kind—at least, not yet. A specter is haunting the Kremlin—the specter of reform, or else revolution.

The illusion of the "monolithic" Leninist party, in or out of state power, is a myth sacred only to cultists of the left and the right. Factions exist in every political formation—a fact which cannot be changed except by repealing human nature. A "Leninist" party in power rapidly takes on many of the characteristics of a multiparty "democratic" state. *De facto* political parties—with their own unofficial spokesmen, publications, and programs—compete for power, often quite openly. This was true in China, on a grand scale—and it is true in Poland today, as the Communist bloc is shaken by fresh convulsions.

In fact, the PUWP [the name of Poland's ruling Communist party] no longer exists as a single entity, except in the formal sense. In the last few months, networks of local dissident PUWP organizations have sprung up. "Almost a shadow party," writes John Darnton in the *New York Times* [4/12/80], "these networks, which began in Szczecin and Gdansk and moved on to Torun and Wroclaw, have engaged in direct secret ballot votes to remove their own officials. They have also set up their own unauthorized commissions to prepare an agenda for the forthcoming national congress."

Most U.S. press accounts leave out an important fact concerning the Solidarity movement. Last fall, the PUWP ordered its rank-&-file to enter the Solidarity union. Solidarity, in turn, instructed its cadre within the PUWP to remain in the party. One million party members also owe allegiance to Solidarity. It is this fact, above all, which leads to our general thesis that the Polish events represent a struggle for power within the Communist party itself. The "renewal," as the upsurge is called in Poland, is a renewal of the ruling class. What is being proclaimed in the West as an anti-Communist revolution is, in fact, a reform movement within the Communist party.

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# POLAND: "RENEWAL" OR REVOLUTION?



BY JUSTIN RAIMONDO

Wall poster of Lenin, photographed in the Warsaw Solidarity office, wearing a Solidarity button and carrying the workers newspaper Robotnik under his arm, reflects the subtle humor within the movement.



Although Walter Grinder and John Hagel III were describing the class structure of U.S. state capitalism in "Toward A Theory of State Capitalism: Ultimate Decision-making and Class Structure" [*Journal of Libertarian Studies*; Winter '77], their analysis is even more applicable to the fully developed statism of the socialist bloc nations—especially Poland. Especially when tensions within the ruling class are described, the Grinder/Hagel analysis is especially evocative of the history and present crisis of Polish (and East European) socialism. After describing how statism blocks the free circulation of elites, causing society to "retrogress into increasingly static 'caste' systems characteristic of feudal and militaristic societies," Grinder and Hagel cite Pareto:

Pareto distinguished between two different psychological types within ruling classes. First, there are the "Lions" who are inherently conservative, valuing stability in a static sense, and who are therefore antagonistic to change and "newcomers." . . . The "Foxes" represent a second type, encompassing speculators who seek out innovation, thrive on change and are masters of Machiavellian manipulation. The term "instinct for combination" describes the "mind-set" of these "Foxes."

. . . The "Foxes" and the "Lions" differ fundamentally regarding appropriate methods of government. For example, the "Foxes" of ascendant ruling classes recognize the importance of the management of recruitment to permit marginal social mobility into the ruling class. . . In contrast, "Lions" would prefer to consolidate the ruling class as a self-perpetuating caste insulated from other social strata. [pp. 73-74]

The secret police enjoy an especially privileged status in Communist bloc nations; they get to patronize stores which stock imported products, they get the best housing and other benefits. It is significant that the March 19 police attack on Solidarity was preceded by a growing barrage of criticism directed at the privileges of the local elite. While everyone else waits in long lines for basic necessities—during the height of the crisis it was announced by the state radio that the whole country had only enough food to last twelve days—this well-fed Red Praetorian Guard encounters growing opposition. The Bydgoszcz attack was the response of Poland's "Lions" to the direct assault by Polish "Foxes" against the privileged insularity of the ruling class. The "Lions"—Kania, Central Committee and Politburo hardliners, and their masters in the Kremlin—drew the line in Bydgoszcz.

It was one thing for Solidarity to reform the official trade union organizations—it was quite another to threaten the host of privileges (from vacation resorts to higher quality medical care). The response of the newly-hardened PUWP leadership—clearly under pressure from Moscow—to Solidarity's threat of an indefinite general strike was to deny any wrongdoing on the part of the police; PUWP "moderates," previously thought to be sympathetic to Solidarity, responded quickly to Moscow's open criticism of the party for being too soft on the union. Kania and his "centrist" faction—which has so far walked the tightrope between Moscow and Solidarity, carefully playing off one against the other—are clearly threatened by the rise of a reform movement within the PUWP. "The push for reforms means that there will be unlimited candidates in the secret balloting for delegates to the (upcoming PUWP) congress," writes John Darnton in the *New York Times*, "a step that breaks the traditional method of careful screening and rigorous control over who attends the congress, which in turn selects the Central Committee. The 140-member Central Committee has so far stayed intact—only 13 members have been replaced since August—but at a reform congress it could be ousted whole."

"The process of recruitment [to the ruling class]," write Grinder and Hagel, ". . . often sets in motion various contradictions which intensify the dynamics of intra-class rivalry. The inability to manage the process of recruitment within acceptable limits may lead to excessive change in the opinion of the conservative 'Lions.' The new recruits, occasionally with some of the old 'Foxes,' may form the nucleus of a new ruling class. The response of the 'Lions' will be to adopt a defensive policy of retrenchment, seeking to dismantle the recruiting mechanisms which were responsible for increasing ruling class heterogeneity. . . ." [Toward A Theory of

State Capitalism"; p. 75] [Emphasis added.]

Nothing describes Moscow's opposition to Solidarity—and "reform" PUWP leaders' attempt to impose a three-month no-strike pledge on the union—better than this libertarian class analysis by Grinder and Hagel.

The balance of class forces in Poland was clarified beyond the shadow of a doubt after Lech Walsea and the "moderate" faction of Solidarity succeeded in ratifying a compromise agreement—an agreement widely criticized within Solidarity as a sell-out. In the aftermath of the agreement it is clear that Walsea has aligned himself with Prime Minister Jaruzelski and the "reform" wing of the PUWP. Significantly, the general strike plan collapsed after Jaruzelski—whose Government has become a rallying point for Poles in the wake of the PUWP's decline—went on television and threatened to resign if "extremists" had their way.



## SOLIDARITY BETRAYED

**W**alsea capitulated immediately. Before, during, and after the talks, Walsea's public pronouncements were indistinguishable from the line put out by the state-controlled press. "If a general strike was called in response to the police attack," said Walsea, "not all the lampposts in Poland will hold all those who will be hanged." In response to attacks on "anti-socialist" forces within Solidarity, Walsea said: "If he [Jaruzelski] points out anti-Soviet forces, we shall help remove them." Walsea joined the Kremlin in attacking KOR (the Committee for Social Self-Defense, a dissident group active in the Solidarity movement). At a time when the Soviet official press agency Tass was attacking KOR activist Jacek Kuron by name, Walsea publicly attacked both Kuron and the militant wing of Solidarity: "I appeal to Kuron and [Karol] Modzelewski [Solidarity leader second only to Walsea] not to draw us into various games. This is not time for quarrels. I am no hero but no one will defeat me. The question is whether we can avoid full-scale confrontation." Walsea was merely echoing Kania, who said: "How can one understand a call for strikes in the present situation? It can only be understood as a call for self-destruction. . . Who has the courage to make a national situation that may lead from a local conflict to a catastrophe?" The Roman Catholic Church intervened in the person of Polish Primate Stefan Cardinal Wyszyński, who reportedly guaranteed the release of five political prisoners, who were subsequently freed by the authorities. Wyszyński himself attended the negotiations where Walsea met with Deputy Minister Wyszynski Rakowski.

On March 30, twenty-four hours before the scheduled general strike was to take place, Walsea announced that an agreement had been reached. The joint communique issued at the conclusion of negotiations did not specifically accuse the police of having beaten unionists, but said they should not have been called in and had been "derelict in their duty" for not "protecting" people in their custody. It said that the inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the incident would continue. The communique did not specifically mandate the dismissal of the local police chief, the deputy provincial governor or others the union wanted ousted. In addition, the issue of the legalization of Rural Solidarity—the new organization representing Poland's private farmers, who own 80% of the agricultural sector—was again side-stepped by the PUWP bureaucrats, and the resolution of this important point is now supposedly in the hands of the Parliament. In the meantime, however, the government has declared that the legality of Rural Solidarity "will not be questioned." [As we go to press the Parliament has legalized Rural Solidarity—essentially in exchange for a three-month strike ban and passage of a law which permits such a ban once a year.] In regard to the union demand that the government stop all proceedings against political dissidents, it was agreed that a joint commission would "look into" the problem. The union and the

government also agreed to set up a joint commission "for consultations and cooperation," according to the *New York Times*, "to defuse crisis situations before they get out of hand." [3/31/81].

To Solidarity activists on the local level it looked like Walsea had joined with the government to defuse Solidarity before the union movement got out of hand.

At the meeting of the union's national commission, Solidarity's chief coordinating body, a letter from two Solidarity members who were victims of the vicious police attack in Bydgoszcz was read to the delegates. "We did not gain anything," the letter said. "Walsea has made bungled decisions. We can compromise on the supply of onions, but not when blood has been spilled." Indeed, Walsea's leadership is being called into question as never before. Out of forty votes on the national commission, only four voted against ratifying the agreement with six abstentions; but, nevertheless, divisions within Solidarity are sharp. Walsea, like his ally the Prime Minister, had threatened to resign if the compromise accord wasn't ratified by the commission.



## NATIONALISM & THE CRISIS OF SOCIALISM

**I**ntraclass warfare between bureaucratic and managerial sectors, between "Lions" and "Foxes," is deeply rooted in the history of Poland—and of Polish socialism, in particular. From 1882, when the first Polish socialist party, the "Proletariat," was smashed by the Russian Czarist secret police; to 1949 when PUWP leader Wladyslaw Gomulka was expelled from the party on orders from Moscow in retaliation for his reform program, the forces of nationalism

and the leftwing of the PPS merged to form the Communist Workers' Party of Poland (CWPP). Their political line—opposition to Polish nationalism and a program which advocated ceding the country to Soviet Russia—did not find much favor, especially not with Lenin himself. At the 8th Congress of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Lenin denounced the Luxemburgists for their opposition to the right of Poles to national self-determination, and warned them that the Red Army was neither capable nor willing to impose Communism by force of arms. [see Lenin; *Collected Works*, Vol. 29, p. 175.]

The CWPP supported Russian troops during the Russian-Polish war of 1920-21, losing 80% of its membership in the process. Although the line changed, in 1921, to support for Polish independence, it was too late. The entire period of the 1920's was marked by fierce factional warfare within the CWPP (re-named the Communist Party of Poland [CPP] in 1925). On three occasions the Comintern removed the entire elected leadership of the CPP—in 1924, 1925 and 1929. In addition, the Stalinist purges took their

Yugoslavia and Albania, which had liberated themselves from the Nazi tyranny)—and all across Eastern Europe an open conflict had broken out within the various Communist parties. The domination of the Russian party was, of course, resented—but, since the Communist parties of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, and East Germany had all been swept into power by the victory of the Red Army against Hitler, and were therefore entirely dependent on the Russians, there was very little to be done about it. But Wladyslaw Gomulka, elected First Secretary of the Polish Workers' (Communist) Party in 1947, often criticized the Luxemburgist tradition of Polish Communism, and spoke in favor of what he called "the Polish road to socialism."

In 1948, the old "Lions" in the Kremlin initiated a campaign against the first of the Communist "Foxes," Marshall Tito. Eager to crush all evidence of "Titoism" in the East European Communist parties, they settled on Gomulka as a convenient scapegoat.

Gomulka and his faction were purged from the leadership; in 1949, Gomulka

consumer goods, and a distinct lack of decent housing in this decrepit "worker's paradise." Strike organizations were organized in every major city. In Poznan, the people marched to the center of town to present their demands. Suddenly, the police attacked. Fifty-three demonstrators were murdered, and three hundred others wounded.

The PUWP underwent a lengthy, agonizing process of self-appraisal—accompanied, of course, by the traditional purges. Scapegoats were found, and a way out was sought. By the Eighth Plenum of the Central Committee, the top leadership was ready to give up the ghost, and the old Stalinists were unceremoniously dumped—in favor of Gomulka, who had been readmitted to the party and was now re-elected to his old post of First Secretary. In his speech to the plenum Gomulka defended the Poznan events as a protest "against distortions of the basic rules of socialism." He explicitly attacked Stalinism; "we have finished with this system," he said, "we shall finish with it once and for all." [Nicholas Bethel, *Gomulka*; Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1969; pp. 218-19.]

Gomulka permitted existing collective farms—the agricultural legacy of Stalinization—to dissolve by a vote of the membership. By 1957, 8280 of the 9790 collective farms had dispersed. But the failure of socialism could not be arrested with a few mild reforms; central planning had led to tremendous dislocations, controls led to shortages, and shortages led to new strikes against price increases announced on Christmas Eve, 1970.

Gomulka, a true "Fox" in sheep's clothing, used force against the striking workers: 45 were killed, and 1165 were wounded. This incident sparked strikes around the nation—and split the party. In Gdansk, for example, 40% of the delegates elected to present the workers' demands to the government were PUWP members. Gomulka, the "Fox," is a type which occurs and re-occurs in the history of post-war Poland with monotonous regularity; the "reformist" betrayer. Walter Grinder and John Hagel III accurately describe Gomulka's evolution when they write: "As the ascendant Foxes succeed in consolidating their position within the ruling class, however, they will increasingly display the psychological traits of their 'Lion' predecessors as they too seek to defend their privileged social position against the challenge of rising new elites within the social system." [Toward A Theory of State Capitalism; *JLS* Vol. I, No. 1; p. 75.] This time, the new "Lions" lost out; the same reform tendency which had propelled Gomulka to the top felled him in a matter of weeks. Forced to resign all his positions, he was replaced as First Secretary by Edward Gierek.

But Gierek met the same fate at the hands of what was to become the present-day movement known as Solidarity. The legacy of Rosa Luxemburg, years of kowtowing to the Kremlin, had split the party into two perpetually warring factions, liberal/nationalist "Foxes" versus Moscow-line "Lions." The historic split in Polish Communism had persisted, steadily widening over the years—until, today, Poland teeters on the brink of revolution and a Soviet invasion.



## REVOLUTION OR "RENEWAL"?

**T**he most recent crisis is Bydgoszcz defined, the Polish events quite clearly in terms of intra-class warfare. Walsea rushed to Bydgoszcz to put out the fire—indeed, his role consisted, at this point, of quelling strike actions rather than initiating or leading them. "We want to settle the problem without further conflict," he told a crowd of four thousand workers outside Solidarity headquarters in Bydgoszcz. "Jaruzelski can be trusted. . . Someone's claws are getting too long, but we will trim them. Not all the authorities are swine. We wish to trust some of them."

But other Solidarity leaders were not so enthusiastic about tying the fate of the movement to another Gomulka. They had learned the lesson of Christmas Eve, 1970—

indeed, many of the most dedicated activists had been politicized by that tragic betrayal.

At the March 23rd meeting of Solidarity's national commission the majority initially favored calling a general strike that Friday. Union militant Karol Modzelewski called the police attack "a provocation to strike a blow at Jaruzelski." "This government," said Modzelewski, "turns out to be a weak government, so it cannot be a partner in talks." The belief that the well-coordinated police attack was a deliberate provocation designed to bring down Jaruzelski's government is apparently widespread in Poland.

Walsea managed to ram through his compromise accord only by threatening to resign, making the issue a vote of confidence at the height of the crisis. Modzelewski, along with Anna Walentynowicz—the Gdansk worker whose dismissal led to the first takeover of the Gdansk shipyard—have both been expelled from the Solidarity leadership, along with other militants. Although a struggle seems to be going on within the various regional Solidarity organizations, it appears that Walsea's attempt to divert the movement into the role of a cheering section for PUWP's "reform" wing has temporarily succeeded. Walsea's "instinct for combination" has unerringly led Solidarity down the well-trodden path to betrayal, the road to another Poznan.

Far from constituting a challenge to the caste system based on socialized property forms, the reforms sought by Walsea and his allies in the Church and the PUWP will strengthen the foundations of that system. Poland's "renewal" is just the opposite of a revolution—which would, of course, overthrow the ruling class of PUWP bureaucrats and managers, and abolish the collectivized property forms their rule depends on. "We do not want to overthrow the party," said Walsea recently—and he is telling the truth. Far from destroying the basis of class rule in Poland, Walsea wants to preserve and "renew" the vile system which denies the people their liberty and the nation its independence. This already discredited attempt to dredge up "socialism with a human face" was predicted by James Burnham in his brilliant-but-flawed book *The Managerial Revolution*. Burnham writes:

. . . with the consolidation of the structure of managerial [i.e. socialist] society, its dictatorial phase (totalitarianism) will change into a democratic phase.

This conclusion is reinforced by two additional considerations. In the first place, it would seem that the managers, the ruling class of the new society, will for their own purposes require at least a limited democracy. The managerial economy cannot operate without a considerable degree of centralized planning. But in planning and coordinating the economic process, one of the factors that must be taken into account is the state of mind of the people, including something of their wants and of their reactions to the work they are doing. Unless these are known, at least roughly, even reasonable efficiency in production is difficult. But totalitarian dictatorship makes it very hard—as Russia especially already proves—to get any information of the state of mind of the people: no one is free to give unbiased information, and the ruling group becomes more and more liable to miscalculate, with the risk of having the social machine break down. A certain measure of democracy makes it easier for the ruling class to get more, and more accurate, information.

Secondly, experience shows that a certain measure of democracy is an excellent way to enable opponents and the masses to let off steam without endangering the foundations of the social fabric. . .

Although Burnham was unwilling to say whether this tendency of socialist bloc nations toward the development of some safety-valve mechanism is ultimately compatible with the one-party "Leninist" system, his speculations (*The Managerial Revolution* was written in 1941) have a prophetic ring. Burnham continues:

It may be that democracy could be introduced [into socialist or what Burnham calls "managerial" society] through the localization of political opposition in such institutions as syndicates, co-operatives, technical associations, or others of the same order perhaps not yet known. These institutions would then, in reality, become opposition political parties, though the fiction of a one-party monopoly could be kept up.

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Supporters of Solidarity link arms at a recent demonstration.

"The Polish events have thrown the Russian ruling class into a crisis; how will the heirs of the October Revolution face the fact that socialism has failed, that the working class is rebelling, that the . . . Leninist party in state power is beginning to crumble at its very foundations?"

"We could have won a lot if we had gone ahead with a general strike right away," declared a delegate from Czestochowa. "But now it's pointless, it's not popular anymore."

"It was our only chance so far to achieve almost everything—farm union, a lessening of censorship, access to mass media," said a delegate from Lublin. "But now it's gone. The balloon of tension has deflated and it can't be blown up again."

Having thrown in his lot with the "Foxes," the government of the new Prime Minister, General Jaruzelski, Walsea defended the settlement, saying he was "70% satisfied" with the terms of the agreement. Clearly, Walsea is running scared: last time he and the government (of ex-Prime Minister Josef Pinkowski) reached an accord, he declared himself "80% satisfied" with the results. Rather than face a decline in his own political fortune, Walsea is now trying to link Solidarity to some latter-day Gomulka retreat, like the new Prime Minister—or possibly whoever rises to power at the reform PUWP congress, to be held sometime before July 20.

and "democratization" have fought hardliners for hegemony.

In 1892 the Polish Socialist party (PPS) was founded, a Polish offshoot of the German Social Democrats. Led by Josef Pilsudski, the PPS drifted toward fascism; and, in 1926, Pilsudski led a successful military coup which seized state power.

In 1893, Rosa Luxemburg, Kark Radek and Adolf Warski led a split-off from the PPS, the Social Democracy of the Kingdom of Poland and of Lithuania (SDKPiL). The major difference between the two groups was their attitude toward nationalism. The PPS wanted independence for Poland. The SDKPiL actually opposed Polish independence, and—like most orthodox Marxists—was highly suspicious of peasantry. (Lenin, on the other hand, criticized both Luxemburg and the PPS.) This division in the Communist movement persisted, and in fact these historic divisions are reflected in the current crisis.

The second Polish republic and the newly-organized Communist Party of Poland were both born in the aftermath of WWI—as was the October Revolution itself. On December 15, 1918, the SDKPiL

toll on the Polish party as well. In 1938, the CPP was secretly dissolved by the Executive Committee of the Communist International headquartered in Moscow. The Kremlin claimed that the CPP Central Committee had been infiltrated by police agents. Hundreds of Polish Communists were sent to the Soviet Union, then shot or sent to prison camps. The purge included the entire Politburo and Secretariat of the CPP, thirty out of thirty-seven members of the Central Committee. Only those leaders still imprisoned in Pilsudski's jails survived.

The Hitler-Stalin Pact decimated Communist parties throughout the world. But, in Poland, the position of the CPP was much less than merely untenable.

Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union changed all that. The Communist line changed, again; suddenly World War II was a "heroic struggle against fascism" rather than an inter-imperialist conflict. As the Red Army swept across Poland, a provisional government led by the CPP was hastily organized.

The Red Army had swept across all Eastern Europe (with the exception of